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Can't We Enlarge the Blanket and the
Bed?' A Comparative Analysis of
Positive/Affirmative Action in the
European Court of Justice and the
United States Supreme Court
By THOMAS TRELOGAN, STEVE MAZURANA & PAUL HODAPP
I. Introduction
In this paper we examine arguments that have been offered for and
against European positive action plans and compare those with a number of
arguments offered in American affirmative action cases. Our focus will be
on the plans considered by the European Court of Justice in four of the
Court's judgments since 2000: Badeck, Abrahamsson, Schnorbus, and
Lommers.2 In the series of papers of which this paper is a part, our overall
purpose is to keep the issue of affirmative action for women alive in the
United States during a period when race-based affirmative action receives
most of the media attention. We also hope our papers may help citizens,
lawyers, and judges in the United States and Europe evaluate the reasoning
1. ROBERT PENN WARREN, ALL THE KING's MEN 136 (2001) ("[The law is] like a
single bed blanket on a double bed and three folks in the bed and a cold night. There ain't
ever enough blanket to cover the case, no matter how much pulling and hauling, and
somebody is always going to nigh catch pneumonia.").
2. Case C-158/97, Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875; Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson v.
Fogelqvist, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5539; Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.C.R. I-
10997; Case C-476/99, Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer in Visserij (19
March 2002), available at <http://curia.eu.int.en>. Four of the six European cases we will
discuss in this paper are from states or Lander in the Federal Republic of Germany-see
DAVID P.CONRADT, THE GERMAN POLITY, 225-27 (Pamela Gordon, Longman Publishers 6th
ed.1996).Bremen is both a city and a state. North Rhine-Westphalia, which includes the
Rhine-Ruhr region, is the most populous state with almost 20 million citizens. Hesse has
fewer than six million citizens.
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of the courts in positive or affirmative action decisions.
II. Positive/Affirmative Action
"Positive action" is the European name for what Americans call
"affirmative action.",4 There is no official definition of positive action, but
in a Communication from the European Commission to the European
Parliament and the European Council, positive action for women was
described as embracing "all measures which aim to counter the effects of
past discrimination, to eliminate existing discrimination and to promote
equality of opportunity between women and men, particularly in relation to
types or levels of jobs where members of one sex are significantly
underrepresented. ' '5  That the elimination of inequalities is one of the
central goals, if not the central goal, of positive action is also emphasized in
the Commission's guide to positive action: "positive action aims to
complement legislation on equal treatment and includes any measure
contributing to the elimination of inequalities in practice."
6
Positive action has been characterized as including the adoption of
quotas and timetables for hiring or promoting female job applicants-
quotas and timetables that may either be automatic or allow preferences to
be overridden in certain circumstances-but also as including
commitments in principle to preferring the under-represented sex,
governmental provisions to reduce social security contributions for firms
that hire women in areas in which they are traditionally under-represented,
and the development of ways to reorganize work time and to provide for
child care to make it easier for women to work.7 Other recommended
3. We hope to challenge the public perception that discrimination is virtually non-
existent and thus that affirmative action is not only unnecessary but also destructive to the
principle of merit in hiring. This perception may result from the shift from overt
discrimination to subtle discrimination based on an unconscious stereotype that male
candidates are better qualified than female candidates, even when the objective
qualifications are equal. Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal
Opportunity, 85 MiNN. L. REV. 587, 617-28 (2000).
4. Katherine Cox, Positive Action in the European Union: From Kalanke to
Marschall, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.101, 105 (1998) (The phrase "positive action" may
have been chosen by the U.K. government as an alternative to "affirmative action" because
of the controversy associated with the phrase in the U.S. Whatever its source, "positive
action" is the term in general use throughout Europe).
5. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on the Interpretation of the Judgment of the Court of Justice on 17 October 1995 in Case
450/93 Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, COM (96)88 final at 3.
6. Positive Action and Equal Opportunities for Women in Employment-A Guide.
Office of Official Publications of the European Community, Luxembourg.
7. Communication, supra note 5, at 9-10.
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measures include encouraging the recruitment of women, advertising for
women in under-represented sectors of the job market, disseminating job
information to women and raising the consciousness of women regarding
job opportunities, diversifying vocational opportunities for women,
offering special job training for women, and encouraging gender sharing of
occupational and family responsibilities.
American authors also define "affirmative action" as including ways
of mitigating identity-based injustices. 9 Given this purpose, affirmative
action has been described as any initiative that seeks to affect positively the
number of certain group members within a larger group.' 0
Of course definitions are not value-neutral. And commentators
continue to question how the different ways of characterizing affirmative
action affect judgments about its efficacy and fairness. For example,
Richard Delgado argues that it has been at least misleading to frame
affirmative action as an issue of minority representation because what there
is right now is a huge affirmative action program for white males."
III. The European Community (EC)
The European Community (EC)--originally called the European
Economic Community (EEC) and now a part of one of the "three pillars" of
the European Union (EU)-was originally created to enable a number of
European states to become a single economic entity. In 1957 six countries
signed the Treaty of Rome creating the EEC.12 Article 2 of the Treaty
8. Council Recommendation of 13 December in Promotion of Positive Action for
Women, 0. J.(L 331/34) (Dec.19, 1984). In this paper we are limited to discussing public
employment and not, for example, positive action in public procurement. For a discussion
on this issue, see Christa Tobler, Encore: 'Women's Clauses' in Public Procurement Under
Community Law, 25 E.E. REV. (2000).
9. DAVID INGRAM, GROUP RIGHTS, 44-45 (2000) (criticizing affirmative action because
it does little to eliminate the inequalities of power and dominance in capitalist economic
systems). See also Gitanjali S. Gutierrez, Taking Account of Another Race: Refraining
Asian-American Challenges to Race-Conscious Admissions in Public Schools, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 1283, 1287 n. 15 (2001) (distinguishing race-conscious programs which have a
"remedial objective to correct historic and institutionalized racism" from preferential
treatment programs which suggest that affirmative action is a "deviation from an otherwise
non-racial neutrality").
10. CAROL LEE BACCHI, THE POLITICS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, 12-15 (1996).
11. Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or Do You Really
Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1223-25 (1991). See also George
Rutherglen, After Affirmative Action: Conditions and Consequences of Ending Preferences
in Employment, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 339, 353 (1992) ("Empirical studies confirm that
women have received only limited benefits from affirmative action.").
12. Treaty Establishing the European Community, March 25, 1957, as amended and
renumbered by the Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the
2004]
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provides the following objectives for the EEC: "a harmonious development
of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in
stability, and accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer
relations between the states belonging to it.''13  Articles 117-22 of the
Treaty provide for the Member States to develop integrated and
harmonious social policies 14 on issues including gender discrimination. In
particular, Article 119 (now 141) requires Member States to give men and
women equal pay for equal work.'
5
The Treaty has been amended on numerous occasions during the
course of the evolutionary process that has given rise to the EU. The most
important amendment for the purposes of this paper is the Treaty of
Amsterdam of 1997.16 Article 12 (now 13) provides the EU with the power
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 0.
J. (C 340) 1, 181, reprinted in 37 ILM 56 (1998) (Treaty). See generally Rebecca Means,
Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen: The Significance of the Kalanke Decision on the
Future of Positive Action in the European Union, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1087, 1089-
94 (1997), for a clear, basic discussion of the Treaty in the context of positive action.
The founding members are Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands. The EU now also includes the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland (1973),
Greece, Spain, Portugal (1981 & 1986), Austria, Finland, and Sweden (1995). NEILL
NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (4th ed. 1999) 23-31.
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Latvia, Estonia,
and Lithuania all also joined the EU in 2004.
13. NUGENT, supra note 12, at 43-45. (The EEC framers accorded a high priority to the
ideology of "free-market, liberal, non-interventionistic capitalism." However, this goal was
always to be tempered by the "Christian democratic and social democratic principles of
most EC governments.").
14. The social policy issues have been particularly difficult for the EC in the 1980s to
90s when 11 of the 12 Member States wished to develop harmonious and integrated social
policies based on the Social Charter adopted by the Council in 1989 by a vote of 11 to 1.
The United Kingdom was opposed to expansion of the EC in the area of social policy. Id. at
74; Caitriona A.Carter, Debates on Social Policy, in THE EUROPEAN UNION HANDBOOK 185,
188-94 (Jackie Gower ed., 2 nd ed. 2002) (1996). (Conservative U.K. governments favored a
deregulated labor market and argued that social policy regulations by the EC would harm
the efficient operation of the free market.Thus, until the British labor government signed on
to these social policy agreements, Member States, especially Germany, France, and Italy,
argued for social policy cooperation, rather than formal EC integration, on the ground that
social welfare policies were helpful to the global market.).
15. Means, supra note 12, at 1110-11. The Treaty provision resulted from a concern by
France that its equal pay policies would place it at an economic disadvantage. But the other
Member States did not comply with the equal pay provision in the Treaty. And in 1974 the
Council adopted its first Social Action Program that proposed more aggressive social
policies to improve living and working conditions for citizens of the EU.
16. Carter, supra note 14, at 186-88. (The Treaty was ambiguous about the extent that
social policy, including positive action, of the Member States would be integrated into the
European Community. Article 117 (now 136) of the Treaty does provide, however, for the
improvement of working conditions and the standard of living for workers, social
protection, and full employment.).
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to take "appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex .... "
Legislation based on this Treaty provision is still subject to unanimity in
the European Council. '
7
While the terms "EU," "EC," and "EEC" have often been used as if
they were interchangeable, for our purposes, the EU is the entity that is
made up of the various Member States, and the EC (formerly the EEC) is
the institutional locus of the system of extra-national law that governs the
Member States of the EU.18
A. EC Political Institutions
Because the EC passed its first sex discrimination legislation in 1976,
we shall begin our discussion of the political structure of the EC by
describing the four principal EC institutions that existed in 1976.19 The
Commission was, and still is, the primary policy initiator of EC legislation.
The Council of Ministers 20 was, and still is, the primary decision making
body of the EC. Its decisions were originally generally unanimous, though
majority voting was later instituted for many decisions. The Assembly,
now the Parliament, exercised limited advisory and supervisory powers. In
1976 it was composed of delegates from national parliaments. In 1978 its
members began to be elected by direct universal suffrage. The Court of
Justice was, and still is, responsible for interpreting and applying EC law.
B. EC Law
The sources of EC law are treaties, legislation, judicial interpretations,
international law, and general principles of law.21  Treaties include
founding treaties, such as the Treaty of Rome and its amendments. These
constitute the primary law of the EC and establish its political institutions.
17. For a fuller discussion of the Treaty of Amsterdam, see NUGENT, supra note 12, at
83.
18. Todd Joseph Koback, The Long Hard Road to Amsterdam, 17 Wis. INT'L. L. J. 463,
464 n. 5 (1999). See also JAMES DINNAGE & JOHN FRANCIS MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (1996); NUGENT, supra note 12, at 66, 243-45. (Since the
time of the creation of the European Union by the Maastricht Treaty, an amendment to the
Treaty of Rome effective November 1993, commentators have been uncertain whether to
refer to EU law, EC law, or Community law. Whatever the phrase, Germany has been
reluctant to recognize the supremacy of this extra-national law, because it does not
sufficiently protect individual rights. Manfred Zuleeg, Gender Equality and Affirmative
Action under the Law of the European Union, 5 COL. J. EUR. L. 319, 326-28 (1999).).
19. NUGENT, supra note 12, at 45-46, 49-53.
20. After 1966, the Council did not typically vote on legislative proposals. Instead
proposals were delayed until there was unanimous agreement. Id., at 168-69.
21. Id. at 242-61 for a fuller discussion of EC law.
2004]
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They also establish individual rights beyond economic rights and have
expressly done so since the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.22 Article 6 of that
treaty provides that the "Union shall respect fundamental rights, as
guaranteed by the (1950) European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. . . and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general
principles of Community Law."
23
EC legislation is secondary law because it makes the general policies
and principles of the treatises into specific laws according to the procedures
specified by the treaties. Article 249 (formerly 189) of the Treaty of Rome
provides for different types of legislation: regulations, directives, decisions,
recommendations, and opinions.24 Regulations are general in that they
apply to all Member States, and they are directly applicable to the Member
States and binding on them without the need for national legislation. By
contrast, directives are "binding as to the result to be achieved upon each
Member State to which [they are] addressed, but shall leave to the national
authorities the choice of form and methods. '25  The contrast between
regulations and directives is not as great in practice as it might appear.
Directives are typically addressed to all Member States; they often leave
little room for discretion and they are directly applicable when the national
legislation is unduly delayed or is inconsistent with the intent of a directive.
Under these circumstances, individuals may sue the Member States in
national courts to enforce the rights provided for in a directive.26
Directives are the legislative source of EC sex discrimination law.
Decisions are binding only on the persons addressed in the decision.
Recommendations lack binding force and are not technically part of EC
law. Judicial interpretations of primary and secondary law will be
discussed in the next section. International law, which has not had a role to
play in EC sex discrimination law, includes the international agreements to
which the EU is a party as well as international treaties to which Member
27States are parties, such as the Human Rights Convention.
22. K.P.E. LASOK, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 123 (7th ed.
2001).
23. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7 1993, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997).
24. Treaty, supra note 12.
25. Id
26. NUGENT, supra note 12, at 246-47. See also Christopher McCrudden, The
Effectiveness of European Equality Law: National Mechanisms for Enforcing Gender
Equality Law in the Light of European Requirements, 13 Ox. J. LEG. STUD. 320, 323 (1993)
(arguing that, in general, directives have only 'vertical direct effect' which means that they
can only be relied upon against the state and not against private persons.).
27. Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs Case C-84/95, Bosphorous v. Hava Yollari,
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The general principles of law are unwritten law to which the Court of
Justice has appealed in interpreting primary and secondary law. There is
agreement that the principles include proportionality (the means must be
appropriate to the end), non-discrimination and equality before the law,
basic human rights, respect for legitimate expectations of those who relied
on the law, and due process.28
C. The European Court of Justice
In positive action cases, the Court's judgments are issued in the form
of preliminary rulings. 29 The Court decides legal questions presented by a
national court of one of the Member States. The Court interprets the
relevant EC legal authorities to determine if the challenged positive action
plan is consistent with them, but does not apply the law to decide the case
itself. This function is reserved for the national court that uses the
preliminary ruling of the ECJ to decide the case. The national courts are
legally bound by the ECJ judgment in all decisions in that case. The Court,
however, is not bound by the common law doctrine of precedent and could
reach a different result in any similar case before it in the future.
Nevertheless, the Court does not lightly alter the rules of law in its
judgments and Member States consider the Court's judgments applicable
and binding throughout the EU for all similar cases. 30
National courts are also bound to apply the interpretive methodology
used by the Court in deciding a case when a national court interprets
national law in relation to EC law. The dominant method of the Court is
teleological and contextual. The Court sees EC law as containing a grand
design. Individual laws are constituent parts of that design. They have a
1996 E.C.R.I-3953 (although the Human Rights Convention is not formally binding on the
EC, it is practically part of EC law).
28. NUGENT, supra note 12, at 258-59 and LASOK, supra note 22, at 178-98.
29. See NUGENT, supra note 12, at 262-75, esp. 269-70, for a fuller discussion of the
Court and Article 234 of the Treaty that provides the Court's authority for preliminary
rulings. At present the Court has 25 members appointed for six-year terms. Member States
nominate individuals who are typically "men of affairs" who have been involved in
government but may have limited judicial experience. Judgments of the Court are
deliberated in secret and decided by majority vote without a published dissent. Preliminary
rulings are not typically decided by all of the judges; rather the cases are assigned to a
chamber of 3-5 judges. See also Jo HUNT, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION HANDBOOK 213, 219-20 (Gover ed., 2d ed. 2002) (The Court now
has two female judges. The first female judge was appointed in 1999. ). For the most
recent information about the Court, visit its website at <http://curia.eu.int/en/>.
30. LASOK, supra note 22, at 163 (The Court is a "continental court" in that it
technically has no law making powers for future cases but merely fills in gaps in
legislation.).
2004]
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purpose that the Court is to discover and make effective. 31
The ECJ does not declare national legislation constitutional or
unconstitutional in the American sense. It is not an appeals court in the
sense that it reviews the final judgments of lower courts. Nevertheless, in
interpreting a national positive action plan as consistent or inconsistent
with EC law, the Court is articulating fundamental or constitutional
principles of EC law.32
D. The Equal Treatment Directive and Positive Action in the European
Court of Justice
The operative legislative document concerning gender equality and
positive action plans is the Equal Treatment Directive. In the 1970s the
Council enacted a series of social policy directives in recognition of the
social policy objectives of the Rome Treaty to improve working conditions
and the standard of living of citizens of the European Economic
Community.33 The first directive was the Equal Pay Directive based on
Article 119 (now 141) of the Treaty, which requires elimination of unequal
pay for women and men.34 However, the Equal Pay Directive could not be
effective until women had access to better paying jobs traditionally enjoyed
by men. Therefore, the Commission proposed the Equal Treatment
Directive, and with the advice of the Assembly, now Parliament, the
Council passed the Directive unanimously.
35
31. Michelle I. Rozof, The European Court of Justice's Ruling in Marschall v. Land
Nordrhein-Westfalen, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1505, 1514 (1998). The Court does not
typically emphasize the subjective intent of the legislators in interpreting EC law, because of
the complexity of the negotiations that lead to EC legislation and because of the multiplicity
of languages involved. Laura Molinari, The Effect of the Kalanke Decision on the European
Union, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 591, 603 (1997).
32. Kendall Thomas, Constitutional Equality, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 329, 351 n. 94
(1999).
33. Molinari, supra note 28, at 606-08; Means, supra note 12, at 1111-12. The
directives came out of a summit meeting of the heads of the Member States in 1972. The
meeting initially resulted in the Commission's Social Action Program that was adopted by
the Council in 1974 with three stated objectives: full employment, improved working and
living conditions, and greater industrial democracy. The objectives required sex equality.
So studies were ordered that showed women were forced into a narrow range of jobs
without a significant chance of promotion, and the studies led to the directives. Koback,
supra note 18, at 468-69; CATHERINE BARNARD, GENDER EQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: A BALANCE SHEET IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 215-20 (Alston,
ed. 1999).
34. Council Directive 75/117, 1975 O.J. (L 30) 19, available at
<http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/index.html>.
35. Molinari, supra note 31, at 608-09 n. 113; Means, supra note 12, at 1112 n. 174.
The Equal Treatment Directive was not based upon an explicit treaty provision; rather it was
[Vol. 28:39
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Article 1 of the Directive sets forth its purpose: "to put into effect in
the Member States the principle of equal treatment for men and women as
regards access to employment." Article 2(1) of the Directive provides that
"there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on the grounds of sex, either
directly or indirectly. 36  However, Article 2(4) provides that this
prohibition does not apply to measures to promote equality of opportunity
for men and women.37 Positive action is one means to the end of
eliminating inequalities that negatively affect women's opportunities in the
workplace. Thus, the Directive permits positive action, or at least some
methods of positive action. But as directives bind Member States only to
the ends of the legislation and allow Member States flexibility in means,
Member States are not required to use positive action to eliminate
inequalities that negatively affect women's job opportunities. Nor are they
required to use a particular form of positive action. Member States may
choose publicity campaigns promoting jobs for women, restructured
workplaces that make it easier for women to balance family and job
responsibilities, or quotas, goals, or timetables designed to increase female
participation in the workplace. But they must act to end gender
discrimination and provide men and women equal access to employment.
Directives typically bind Member States only. Thus, the Equal
Treatment Directive does not apply directly to a private employer unless it
is controlled by a public entity or public authority, such as private
employers that provide state-financed medical services. And the private
employer covered by the Directive must be endowed with special powers
by the state.38 If the Council wished to permit an employee to sue a private
employer, it would have issued a regulation, which does have a direct
effect on private individuals in addition to the Member States.
In the 1970s the Court also established certain legal principles that
justified by Article 235 (now 308) of the Treaty of Rome as a necessary means to give effect
to the equal pay provision of the Treaty. The Preamble of the Directive states that
Community action is necessary to achieve equal treatment for women and men in access to
employment, and equal treatment is an objective of the Community necessary to further the
stated objective of improving living and working conditions in the Community.
36. The distinction between direct and indirect discrimination is that direct
discrimination requires the use of sex-based classifications (whether or not sex
discrimination is intended), whereas indirect discrimination occurs when a facially neutral
classification has an adverse effect on one gender. Means, supra note 12, at 1113 n. 182.
37. Council Directive 76/207/EEC, 1976 O.J. (L 39/40) (On the Implementation of the
Principle of Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards Access to Employment,
Vocational Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions).
38. Case C-152/84, Marshall v. Southhampton & South-West Hampshire Area Health
Authority, 1986 E.C.R. 723 and Case C-188/90, Foster v. British Gas, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3313.
See generally Zuleeg, supra note 18, at 324-28.
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would be important in later decisions in the 1990s interpreting the Equal
Treatment Directive. The occasion was three cases brought by Ms.
Defrenne against her employer Sabena under the equal pay provision of the
Treaty of Rome, which does have a direct binding effect on both public and
private employers.
In Defrenne I the Court recognized that one incentive for the Treaty's
equal pay provision was equal competition in the markets of the Member
States.39 If economics had been the Treaty's sole objective, then the law of
sexual equality would have evolved very differently; the U.K. and Ireland
argued that they could not afford to eliminate pay discrimination against
women. They reasoned that the subsequent increase in labor costs would
lead to inflation and make their economies unstable.4°
However, the Court recognized that the Community had a second
objective: the social welfare of workers. Thus the Court held in Defrenne
III that Article 119 (now 141) of the Treaty created fundamental rights in
workers in the Community. 41 But the European Council in the Equal
Treatment Directive had already interpreted the fundamental right to a
workplace free of discrimination in terms of formal equality, which does
not threaten the inequality in family duties.
The Equal Treatment Directive was deliberately drafted to focus
solely on formal equality for women working outside the home. Legal
advisors had opined that the EU could legislate only in employment
matters. "Legislation in relation to the family would, it was argued, have
surpassed the limits of legality. Such reasoning demonstrates once more
how the family and work are constructed as mutually exclusive spheres. ,42
In 1984 the Council adopted a non-binding recommendation to clarify
its position on positive action. The Recommendation does not include a
recommendation for the more controversial forms of positive action, e.g.,
39. Case C-43/75, Defrenne II, 1976 E.C.R. 455.
40. Id. at 464, 472.
41. Case C-148/77 Defrenne III, 1978 E.C.R. 1365. See generally Catherine Barnard,
Gender Equality in the EU: A Balance Sheet, in The EU and Human Rights, 217 (1999) in
SEX EQUALITY: LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 10 (Hume Papers on Public Policy 1993).
42. Gillian More, Equality of Treatment in European Community Law, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL SUBJECTS OF LAW 261-78 (Anne Bottomley ed. ,
1996); Gillian More, Equal Treatment of the Sexes in E. C.Law, in I FEMINIST LEGAL
STUDIES 45, 55-59 (1993). (A 1970s report commissioned by the Commission clearly
demonstrated the extent of sex discrimination throughout the EC. As a result, the
Commission issued its Social Action Program in 1974. One important provision recognized
the need to address the inequality in family responsibilities as an integral part of workplace
equality.)
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quotas.43 But the Recommendation does recognize that even the limited
goal of equal opportunity for women at work requires addressing inequality
in the wider society, including the family. The Recommendation states,
"Existing legal provisions on equal treatment which are designed to afford
rights to individuals are inadequate for the elimination of all existing
inequalities unless parallel action is taken by governments, both sides of
industry and other bodies concerned, to counteract the prejudicial effects on
women in employment which arise from social attitudes, behavior and
structures." 4
The positive action measures recommended by the Council included:
information, respect, studies, vocational training, counseling,
encouragement, adjustment of working conditions, and active participation
in decision-making.45 The Recommendation was controversial because the
Commission had previously requested a study of positive action schemes in
the European Community. The study recommended that a new directive be
issued that would make positive action obligatory in the EC and in public
bodies in the Member States.46 The Commission agreed with the Report.
However, the Council preferred a recommendation because it would be
supported by the Member States. For example, the U.K. publicly
welcomed the Recommendation which was consistent with the U.K. Sex
Discrimination Act of 1975. The Act allows limited forms of positive
action such as single-sex training courses.47
E. Criticism of Formal Equality in the Equal Treatment Directive
A fundamental criticism of the Directive is that it is premised on the
concept of formal equality. Formal equality requires that men and women
who are considered similar as workers are to be treated the same unless a
justification clearly exists for differentiating between the sexes. In such a
43. EVELYN ELLIS, SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW 246-47 (1988).
44. Council Recommendation 84/635 on the Promotion of Positive Action for Women,
1984 O.J. (L 331/34).
45. Id. at para. 4.
46. CREWS Reports (1983) vol. 3, no. 3, at 4. See generally ELLIS, supra note 43, at
246-47.
47. Robin & Catherine Chater, Positive Action: Toward a Strategic Approach, 7
WOMEN IN MANAGEMENT REv.3, 6 (1992) at <http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org/WebZ/FTFE>.
After the Recommendation, Member States took the following positive action steps among
others: the Netherlands' telecommunications corporation gave a preference for qualified
female applicants, bolstered female recruitment advertising, and imposed quotas for
appointments (50% for lower jobs and 30% for upper jobs); Belgium provided state-funded
experts on positive action for private sector employers; and in 1991, Italy, one of the most
progressive of the EC states, provided state-funded financial support for positive action. Id.
at 7.
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case an exception is permitted to the identity principle. A justification for
differentiating between the sexes would exist, for example, whenever
inequality of treatment is necessary to ensure equality of opportunity.
One criticism of the Directive's formal principle is that it is not value-
neutral. Rather-so the argument goes-it smuggles in a male norm of the
worker to which women are compared, a principle of market domination,
and a narrow vision of individualism.
48
A second criticism of the Directive's formal equality principle is that
it is inadequate to achieve equal results for women as a group in such
stratified patriarchal societies as Europe and the United States,49 where
distribution of income, prestige, and well-being are structured along gender
lines. 50 Women as a group have been, and continue to be, systematically
discriminated against as a result of traditional ways of organizing men and
women at work and in the family.5' In terms of the race analogy, men still
start the employment race for good jobs closer to the finish line and thus
they continue to win the races for the better jobs. 52
48. More, supra note 42, at 58. See also BACCHI, supra note 10, at 24-25. Formal
equality creates a we/they dichotomy where the disadvantaged who fall outside the white
male norm can only be let in by conforming to the norm at the expense of other
disadvantaged persons and under conditions that are set by those who are already in charge
of setting and enforcing the norm.
49. Nick Jewson and David Mason, The Theory and Practice of Equal Opportunity, 34
Soc. REV. 307 (1986). See also Notes, The Relationship between Equality and Access in
Law School Admissions, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1453-54 (2000) (by the late 1960s formal
equality was seen to be inadequate to achieve widespread integration. Civil rights advocates
argued for a result oriented equality, which the United States Supreme Court accepted but
not to the extent of accepting quotas). Compare Diana Majury, Strategizing in Equality, 3
Wis. WOMEN'S L. J. 169, 173-77 (1987) (arguing that women should refuse to commit to
any single meaning of equality but "develop some equality based tools [to] assist feminist
activists in their work on specific issues").
50. For a summary of the continuing disparities in workplace success between men and
women in the United States, see Lawton, supra note 3, at 599-612. For data comparing
American and European gender inequality, see ANNE PETERS, WOMEN, QUOTAS AND
CONSTITUTIONS 277-78 (1999).
51. Kevin Brew & Thomas Garavan, Eliminating Equality - Women-Only Training, 19
J. EuR. INDUS. TRAINING 13, 14-15 (1995) at <http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org/WebZ/FSQU>
(The gender pay gap in the EU is still 18%. The female employment rate is 53%. The
female unemployment rate is 3% higher than men's. Women account for 77% of low-
income employees and they are concentrated in low-income occupations.).
52. Catherine Barnard & Bob Hepple, Substantive Equality, 59 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 562,
565-67 (2000). (One way to picture the formal/substantive equality distinction is in terms of
a race analogy. Substantive equality requires that all participants start from the same
starting point. Special measures or positive action must be used to compensate women for
disadvantages and thus make it more likely that women will be able to take advantage of
opportunities available in the job market. By contrast formal equality involves merely the
removal of obstacles, e.g., word-of-mouth recruiting and non-job related selection criteria.
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But what alternative or alternatives to formal equality would not be
subject to these criticisms?
This distinction between formal and non-formal equality has been
described in a number of different ways. One author, for example,
distinguishes between individual justice (formal equality) and group
justice. The former:
[C]oncentrates on cleansing the process of decision-making, and is not
concerned with the result, except as an indicator of a flawed process. It
is markedly individualistic in its orientation: concentrating on securing
fairness for the individual. It is generally expressed in universal and
symmetrical terms: women and men are equally protected. It reflects
respect for efficiency, merit and achievement and, given the limited
degrees of intervention permitted, it preserves, and possibly enhances,
the operation of the market.
53
Thus, one alternative to formal equality is equal results for women as a
group.
In contrast to formal equality, a results-oriented or substantive
equality focuses on the goal of equalizing burdens and benefits for women
and men. Persons committed to substantive equality attempt distributions
that are equal in their effect on the lives of women and men. One argument
in favor of the connection between the group model and substantive
equality is that women are discriminated against as a group and thus the
remedy for that discrimination, including positive action, must also treat
women as a group.54 For example, women's domestic and parental roles
differ from those of men, and these roles make it difficult for women to be
perceived as efficient workers. Formal equality allows employers to
continue to treat female employees less well than male employees, because
they have an apparent market justification for doing so. By contrast, the
goal of substantive equality rejects the presupposition of the employers'
perception because it "holds that the disadvantaging of women who do not
However, many more distinctions are possible. The authors, citing other articles,
distinguish four "overlapping" conceptions of substantive equality: equality of result,
equality of opportunity, equality of substantive rights, and equality of respect. Id. at 564 n.
19.).
53. McCrudden, supra note 26, at 327. (By contrast, group justice tends to be
redistributive and focused on the relative improvement of the position of women.) See also
Marzia Barbera, Not the Same? The Judicial Role in the New Community Anti-
discrimination Law Context, 31 IND. L. J. 82, 83 (2002) (distinguishing a substantive rights
model in which absolute rights are trump cards and an anti-discrimination or formal equality
model in which the best protection for rights "lies in the political process").
54. Luke Charles & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action as Equalizing Opportunity:
Challenging the Myth of Preferential Treatment, 16 NAT'L BLACK L. J. 127, 129-31 (1999).
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adhere to the male norm is discriminatory." 55
As criticism of formal equality in the Equal Treatment Directive
continued, women worked to make substantive equality supplant formal
equality in EC law. And their efforts met recently with limited success.
F. The Treaty ofAmsterdam and Subsequent Legislative Developments
The EU took a step toward substantive equality in the Amsterdam
Treaty, which designates equality and positive action as goals in all EU
activities. 56 Article 2 specifically provides for "equality between men and
women" as one of the tasks of the EU.57 Article 3(2) provides that the EU
is to "aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality between men
and women. 58 Article 118 (now 140) includes "equality between men and
women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work"
as activities of Member States that the EU promises to support.5 9 Article 6
allows the EU to "take appropriate action to combat discrimination based
on sex.' 6° But again the Article requires unanimity in the Council, so that
the practical effect of the Article is likely to be limited.61
A final paragraph has been added to Article 119 (now 141) of the
Treaty. The aim of the EU is now "full equality in practice." 62 To this end,
the principle of equal treatment "shall not prevent any Member States from
maintaining or adopting measures for specific advantages in order to make
it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to
prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers."
63
The concept of full equality should be read to include both formal and
55. Helen Fenwick & Tamara Hervey, Sex Equality and the Single Market: New
Directions for the European Court of Justice, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 443, 444-46
(1995) ("Formal equality also supports explanations of gender inequality in terms of
individual choices by individual women rather than structural inequalities in a market where
efficiency is the primary value. Substantive equality demands that male norms of the
efficient and therefore meritorious worker be expanded to recognize disadvantages with
which women enter the workplace.").
56. Treaty, supra note 12.
57. Treaty art. 2.
58. Treaty art. 3(2).
59. Treaty art. 140.
60. Treaty art. 6.
61. Evelyn Ellis, Recent Developments in European Community Sex Equality Law, 35
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 379, 380-81 (1998).
62. Treaty supra note 12, art. 141.
63. Treaty. See also Declaration on Articles 119(4) of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Declaration 28 to the Treaty. See generally Elizabeth F. Defeis, The
Treaty of Amsterdam: The Next Step Towards Gender Equality, 23 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 1, 30-33 (1999).
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substantive equality in light of the permissible justifications for positive
action. The Treaty now allows three justifications for positive action.
Positive action is permissible, first, to make it easier for both women and
men to pursue jobs in which they are under-represented. It is important to
note that the Treaty does not use the term "compete." "Pursue" suggests
that this consequentialist justification is independent of an equality of
opportunity justification. We cannot argue here from the language of the
English version of the Treaty. Nevertheless, one purpose of the paragraph
is to add a consequentialist justification for positive action that is not
limited to securing equality of opportunity. For example, positive action
that equalized domestic responsibilities would. be helpful to women at
work, and thus permissible under the Treaty. Positive action may now be
justified so long as it is helpful to women in the entire process of job-
seeking, and is therefore no longer limited to measures designed to equalize
competitive opportunities for women and men. Equally important, the
Treaty avoids success verbs such as "achieve," the use of which would
clearly suggest something more like a quota that is meant to operate
regardless of the qualifications of the candidates. Nevertheless, this
language should allow positive action that seeks to achieve substantive
results in increasing the percentage of women in the workplace.64
The second justification is similar to arguments based on the concept
of formal equality that are designed to permit positive action to remove
obstacles, e.g., stereotyping in job selection criteria, that disadvantage
women seeking employment. But the language and purpose is broader and
includes substantive equality in so far as it aims to prevent stereotypes from
continuing to disadvantage women. One way to prevent recurring
stereotypes is to increase inter-gender contact. Inter-gender contact
reduces prejudice over time when individuals are equal, cooperative, and
friendly.65 It would not be unreasonable then for Member States to
64. The language of the Treaty applies to persons who belong to a gender-based group
that is under-represented in a position. Thus, the basis of the classification is under-
representedness. The Treaty does not give preferential treatment to women. And thus, this
classification is not discriminatory and is not an exception to the formal principle of equality
of treatment as expressed in the Equal Treatment Directive. Arguably, Article 141(4)
replaces the Directive's Article 2(4) which treats positive action as an exception to equal
treatment. Accord Barnard, supra note 52, at 576 n. 96. But see Helen Fenwick, From
Formal to Substantive Equality: The place of Affirmative Action in European Union Sex
Equality Law, 4 EuR. PuB. L. 507, 515-16 (1998) (Article 141(4) is still a "derogation from
the equal treatment principle" and must be strictly interpreted. However, the omission of
the equal opportunity language suggests broadening the possibility of positive action toward
the substantive equality model).
65. Cynthia Estlund, Work and Family, 21 CoMP. LAB. L.& POL'Y J. 467, 487-88
(2000).
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conclude that increased employment of women outside of traditional
bottom-rung jobs is a reasonable means to prevent disadvantages from
recurring. It remains to be determined by the ECJ whether in the broad
context of changes to the Treaty this justification permits some form of
quotas and goals as a reasonable means to increase workplace participation
among women.
The third justification is a compensatory argument that may be limited
by the Court to the compensation of individual victims who can identify a
perpetrator of discrimination.66 But in light of the breadth of the first two
justifications, this may also be read broadly to include group based
compensation.
Finally, a relevant provision of the revised Directive is Art 2(8), which
provides that Member States may maintain or adopt measures within the
meaning of Article 141(4) of the Treaty with a view to ensuring full
equality in practice between men and women.67 But, Member States will
be required to establish an independent body to promote equal treatment of
women and men. That body will investigate sex discrimination complaints,
initiate administrative and judicial proceedings, and publish surveys and
reports.68
G. Present State of the Argument for Gender Equality in the EU
Substantive equality for women has been controversial in the EU.
Positive action to achieve substantive equality in the form of equal
outcomes for women in the job market and not just formal equality of
opportunity has been subjected to three major criticisms,69 which have been
answered by amendments to the Treaty of Amsterdam.
First, positive action is said to disregard merit, which is purported to
be the sole basis for a fair distribution of jobs. The Treaty, however,
answers this objection by putting forward three requirements for the fair
distribution of jobs that are, as defensible as is the merit principle: 70 such a
66. ALAN GOLDMAN, JUSTICE AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATIoN 67 (1979).
(Compensatory justice is best understood as the compensation of individuals.).
67. COM(2000)334 fin., OJ 2000 337E/204. The revised Directive is: Directive
2002/73/EC, OJ 2002 L 269/15. For a general discussion of the revision process, see
Christa Tobler, Positive Action under the Revised Second Equal Treatment Directive, at
<www.ewla.org/wfdi/tobler.doc> (2002) pages 6-8.
68. Id.
69. Bhikhu Parekh, A Case for Positive Discrimination, in Anne Bottomley, supra note
42, at 272.
70. For a recent criticism of the merit principle, see Alan Kemp, The Missing
Jurisprudence of Merit, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J., 141, 145-46 (2002) (merit as an argument
against affirmative action in the U.S. is disingenuous because the basis of U.S. employment
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distribution must (1) help under-represented groups overcome their under-
representation, (2) promote equality of opportunity, and (3) compensate for
past harms. 71 There is no suggestion in the Treaty that these principles are
to replace the merit principle that only the most qualified persons may be
hired as part of a positive action plan. Instead all four principles are to be
used together.
Second, positive action is said to be unfair when women who are not
discriminated against are compensated for harms they never suffered and
when underprivileged men are punished for the discrimination perpetuated
primarily by men of privilege. The Treaty recognizes that compensation is
only one of the justifications for positive action and thus is not committed
to the view that positive action itself must provide compensation in all
cases.
Third, positive action, because it is inefficient and unjust, is said to
create a bad precedent for the future. This argument assumes the validity
of the prior arguments. And thus the Treaty answered it in answering the
prior arguments against positive action.72
H. Positive Action Judgments in the European Court of Justice
We have provided a brief description of the history of relevant
positive action law in the treaties and legislation in the EC. The central
remaining question is how the Court has interpreted this body of law. The
Court's judgments can be divided into those made before the adoption of
the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and those made after.
In interpreting the Equal Treatment Directive in its first round of
positive action cases, the Court had to decide when positive action is
consistent with the fundamental right to be treated equally. In the two
leading cases, Kalanke and Marschall,73 the Court set out the following
law is employment-at-will, not merit). See also John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity,
Affirmative Action and the Anti-discrimination Principle: The Questionable Basis for the
Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 423, 430-33 (2002) (a libertarian
argument for employer autonomy rather than merit as the proper basis for employment
decision-making).
71. Treaty, supra note 12.
72. For an excellent evaluation of the arguments against affirmative action, see Richard
Delgado, Ten Arguments Against Affirmative Action, 50 ALA. L. REv. 135, 142-45 (1998);
Charles Daye, On Blackberry Picking, Generations of Affirmative Action, and Less
Dangerous Enterprises, 45 STAN. L. REv. 485, 491-92 (1993).
73. Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. 1-1875; Case C-409/95, Marschall
v. Land Nordhein-Westfalen, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6363. Since both these cases arose in the
national courts in Germany, it may be helpful to read a general discussion of German
positive action law, see Peters, supra note 50, at ch. IV.
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principles. First, positive action is an exception to the fundamental right of
equal treatment. Any permissible exception is limited to special measures
intended to eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality. Second, no
automatic job preference or quota is justifiable simply because a group is
under-represented in a position. Third, a rebuttable presumption favoring
women is justified, if women are under-represented in a position and if
equally qualified male candidates for the position are objectively assessed
on their individual merits.74
A rebuttable presumption favoring women is consistent with the Equal
Treatment Directive's emphasis on equal opportunity, because positive
action is a reasonable means to achieve equality of opportunity for women
by overcoming stereotypes that hinder the advancement of women in the
workplace.
75
I. Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen
In Kalanke, the state of Bremen legislated a priority for women in
hiring in public employment. 76 The priority was triggered when a female
candidate had equal qualifications to the male candidates and women were
under-represented7 7 in the position.78 The Bremen law allowed non-
traditional job qualifications, including maternal and housekeeping
experience, to establish equal qualifications.79
Specifically, the law provided:
(2) In the case of an assignment of an activity in a higher pay,
74. Case C-158/97 Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875, available at <http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/index.html>.
75. Marschall, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6363,1 13.
76. Law on Equal Treatment of Men and Women in the Public Service of the Land of
Bremen (20 Nov. 1990).
77. German quotas for women are typically tied to the fact that women are
approximately one-half of the population. Some commentators argue that such a high target
makes it difficult for men to compete for positions in the foreseeable future, especially given
the continuing extreme under-representations of women in top positions even after ten years
of positive action in Germany. PETERS, supra note 50, at 289.
78. Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051 at Conclusions of the Advocate-General 13-20.
The British government presented three arguments against the Bremen law. First, positive
action is social engineering that is irrelevant to the objective of providing equal opportunity
for women. Second, the proponents of positive action assume without justification that
unequal representation in the workplace is the result of discrimination. Third, the quotas in
the Bremen law are intended to achieve equal results, not equal opportunity. The
Commission of the European Union countered that the Bremen quotas were lawful because
they applied only as a tie-breaker in the case of equally qualified candidates. And the Equal
Treatment Directive allowed equal results, because it required Member States to achieve
actual equality. For a general discussion of Kalanke, see Koback, supra note 18, at 476-77.
79. Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051 at Judgment T 3.
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remuneration and salary bracket, women who have qualifications
equal to those of their male co-applicants shall be given priority
in sectors where they are under-represented ....
(4) Qualifications shall be evaluated exclusively in accordance
with the requirements of the profession, post to be occupied or
career. Specific experience and capabilities, such as those
acquired as a result of family work, social commitment or unpaid
activity, are part of the qualifications within the meaning of
subparagraph (1) and (2) if they are of use in performing the
activity in question. 80
(5) There is under-representation if women do not represent at
least one half of the persons in the individual pay, remuneration
and salary brackets in the relevant personnel group of an official
body.81
The facts of the Kalanke dispute are as follows. In 1990 the city of
Bremen within the state of Bremen published a vacancy notice for the
section manager post in the city's parks department. Two employees
competed for the position, Mr. Kalanke, deputy section manager, and Ms.
Glissman. The department manager recommended Mr. Kalanke. But a
Conciliation Board ruled that both candidates were equally qualified and
that Ms. Glissman should be awarded the promotion because of section 4 of
the state of Bremen's equality law. 82
Ms. Glissman was appointed and Mr. Kalanke appealed the decision.
His suit was dismissed by the lower German courts. However, the Federal
Labor Court, before deciding his case, sought a preliminary ruling from the
European Court of Justice on the question whether the Bremen state law
violated the Equal Treatment Directive.
83
Advocate-General Tesauro in his opinion determined that the Bremen
state law was discriminatory under Article 2(1) of the Directive and that the
law did not satisfy the requirements of a valid exception under Article
2(4).84 The Court followed the conclusion of the AG without further
reasoning.85
80. This provision tries to break down the distinction between work in and out of the
home. However, such provisions have had only limited success in assisting women in the
labor market. Koback, supra note 18, at 473 n. 62.
81. Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051 at Judgment 3.
82. Id. at Judgment 1-7.
83. Id. at Judgment 11.
84. Id. at Conclusions of the Advocate-General 28.
85. Id. at Judgment 22 ("National rules which guarantee women absolute and
unconditional priority for appointment or promotion go beyond promoting equal
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Central to the AG's reasoning in Kalanke is the distinction between
equality of opportunity and equality of results, or in other words, the
distinction between formal and substantive equality. Automatic quotas,
such as the priority in the Bremen law, are interpreted as attempts to
achieve equality of results. And equality of results is not an authorized
exception to equal treatment in the Directive that allows only positive
action plans that improve women's ability to compete in the labor market
with men.
86
As we saw above, the strictness of the distinction between equality of
opportunity and equality of results may be questioned on the ground that a
national legislature may reasonably believe that striving to obtain equal
results is a reasonable way to increase equality of opportunity for women.
After all, the more often public employers hire and promote women, the
more likely they are to have experiences that weaken traditional stereotypes
regarding working women.
87
The limited either-or thinking of the AG was clear from the beginning
of his opinion when he defined the issue facing the Court as whether the
fundamental right of each individual to be free from sex discrimination
must give way to the rights of minorities to be compensated for past
discrimination. 88 He defined "positive action" as a form of preferential
treatment for disadvantaged groups.89 Since the right to preferential
compensation is not a fundamental right, it was easy to conclude that
positive action could not trump the fundamental right not to be
discriminated against.
But the key question was not whether the Bremen law appeared
discriminatory under the Equal Treatment Directive. On its face it
provided a priority to women not available to men. The key question was
whether the law fell within the exception in Article 2(4), which creates
equal opportunities for men and women, including positive action that
removes existing inequalities that affect women's opportunities in
employment. According to the AG, positive action that does not remove
obstacles is not permissible under the Directive. But the language of the
Directive makes it plain that the removal of obstacles is only one example
opportunities and overstep the limits of the exception in Article 2(4)."). See also ELLIS,
supra note 43, at 405 ("The brevity of the Court's judgment suggests some judicial
disagreement over its conclusion.").
86. Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051 at 13. The AG may have been influenced by the
arguments before the Court by the U.K.
87. Estlund, supra note 65.
88. Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. 1- 3051 at Conclusions of the Advocate-General 7 1, 7.
89. Id. at Conclusions of the Advocate-General 7 8-10.
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of permissible means to the end of creating equal opportunities. 90
In conclusion, the reasoning of the AG is not persuasive regarding the
limitations he imposes on positive action. There is little support in the text
of the Equal Treatment Directive to support his rigid dichotomy between
equality of opportunity and equality of results. Instead the Directive's
purpose of reducing actual instances of inequality in social life suggests a
broad reading of the Directive that permits legislation, like Bremen's, that
aims at equal results for women so long as the legislation is reasonably
designed to achieve equal opportunity for women.9' The reconciliation of
equality of opportunity with equality of results is one of the results of the
Court's next positive action judgment. 92
J. Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen
In its next positive action decision, the Court did not reject its
judgment in Kalanke but it did distinguish and limit it. 93 In Marschall, the
Court allowed a positive action plan that created a priority for women in
employment decisions when there are fewer women than men in the
relevant positions and female candidates are equally qualified for the
position. However, a male candidate could overcome the priority with
90. Koback, supra note 18, at 481. Even the prior decision of the Court, cited by the
AG, did not interpret Article 2(4) as limited to removing obstacles for women. Instead
permissible positive action must "eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality which
may exist in the reality of social life. " Case C-312/86, Commission v. France, 1988 E.C.R.
1-6332. See generally Ann Donahue, The Kalanke Ruling: Gender Equality in the European
Labor Market, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 730, 738-39 (1998).
91. See also Donahue, supra note 90, at 738-39.
92. Id. at 745-54 for a full discussion of the political and business responses to Kalanke.
In general, some thought that it was the end of shortlists and positive discrimination, except
for merit discrimination. Others considered it a "step backward," "out of touch with
reality." See also Ninon Colneric, Making Equality More Effective: Lessons from the
German Experience, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L. J.229, 244-45 (1996) (The actual effects of
Kalanke were limited, because the "vast majority of laws regarding decision quotas were not
directly affected." They already allowed men with special circumstances to create
exceptions to the decision quotas. ). The Commission proposed an amendment to the Equal
Treatment Directive that allowed positive action short of rigid quotas. Proposal for a
Council Directive amending Directive 76/207/EEC, 1996 O.J. (C 179) 8. See also
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the
interpretation of the Judgment of the Court of Justices on 17 October 1995 in Case C-
450/93, 1997 O.J. (C 30) 5. However, the proposal has been mooted by subsequent
developments in the Court and in the Treaty of Amsterdam.
93. The ECJ has no formal system of binding case law precedent. A judgment is only
binding in the immediate case. Thus, the Court's decision in Kalanke would not have been
binding on the Court in Marschall. Nevertheless, a prior judgment has persuasive force in
later cases, since the Court seeks consistency in its judgments. Rozof, supra note 31, at
1516 n.61; LASOK, supra note 22, at 163.
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evidence that favors the decision to hire him.94 Commentators have since
suggested that this evidence might include evidence that the male candidate
has an unbroken work history, or that the male candidate is married with
children.95
The law of the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen provided that "Where, in
the sector of the authority responsible for promotion, there are fewer
women than men in the particular higher grade post in the career bracket,
women are to be given priority for promotion in the event of equal
suitability, competence, and professional performance, unless reasons
specific to an individual candidate tilt the balance in his favour."
96
The national law creating the plan was defended before the Court as
necessary to counteract the inequality of opportunity suffered by women in
the workplace. Public employers tend to promote men over women
because of stereotypes that men are heads of households and are the
breadwinners for families. In addition, employers believe that women
interrupt their careers more frequently than men, are less flexible in the
hours they are available for work, and are absent from work more often
than men.97
In Marschall, a school teacher was denied a promotion that was given
to a female teacher. He appealed. A German administrative court believed
that the law was contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive as interpreted in
Kalanke but stayed the proceedings until the European Court of Justice
issued a preliminary ruling on the issue.
98
In the Advocate-General's opinion in Marschall,99 Advocate-General
Jacobs essentially followed the reasoning of AG Tesauro in Kalanke.
Advocate-General Jacobs initially determined that the plan in
Marschall was prima-facie discriminatory and thus contrary to Article 2(1)
94. Marschall, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6363 at Judgment 35.
95. Austin Clayton, Comment, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen: Has
Equal Opportunity between the Sexes Finally Found a Champion in European Community
Law? 16 B. U. INT'L L. J. 423, 443-44 (1998). The author suggests that permissible other
criteria to rebut the presumption might include facts that the male candidate was a member
of a racial minority, was the principle childcare provider in the family, or was disabled.
96. Marschall, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6363 at Judgment 3, 13. The law is similar to the law
of the state of Bremen at issue in the Kalanke case, except for the presence of the "savings
clause" in the law of the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen. See Tobler, supra note 69 at 8.
97. Id. at Judgment 29. In addition, the Finnish government defended the need for
positive action based on its experience that other measures to aid women in employment,
such as additional job training and counseling, and steps to assist families in sharing
household responsibilities, are insufficient to end job discrimination against women. Id. at
Judgment 16.
98. Id. at Judgment 6-10.
99. Id. at Conclusions of the Advocate General 27-44.
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of the Equal Treatment Directive. Regarding whether the plan was saved
by the exception in Article 2(4), he reasoned that the Court should follow
its judgment in Kalanke and decide that the Nordrhein-Westfalen plan did
not fall within the exception. He reasoned that an automatic preference,
which was rejected in Kalanke, is one that favors women simply because
they are women. Thus, a preference is not saved because it allows men to
rebut the preference. Thus, the Nordrhein-Westfalen positive action plan is
indistinguishable from the Kalanke plan and must also be rejected.' 00
According to the Advocate-General, when candidates are equally
qualified, a preference for women cannot seek to achieve equal opportunity
for women. Under these circumstances, women already have equality of
opportunity or they could not have achieved the status of equal
qualifications. If, at this point, women are given a job preference, the
effect is to provide them with a competitive advantage that, by definition,
goes beyond equal opportunity to equal result.' 0'
The effect of the shared reasoning of the two AG's was that the Court
was not provided with an opinion that questioned the equal result/equal
opportunity dichotomy. Challenges to the rigid dichotomy would have
included the following arguments. First, the equal result/equal opportunity
dichotomy is a classic example of the fallacy of exclusive alternatives. As
we mentioned above, a national legislature might reasonably have
considered an automatic preference as a reasonable way to achieve equality
of opportunity. The language of the Equal Treatment Directive does not
prohibit a legislature from seeking to achieve equal results or to use
positive action to achieve an equal result so long as the ultimate aim of the
legislature is to achieve equality of opportunity.
Second, an equally qualified female candidate for a job may still
require a preference to overcome stereotypes that are used by the public
employer at the final stage of the decision-making process. In fact, the
need for a preference to overcome stereotypes against women is greatest at
this final stage when the candidates' qualifications are objectively equal
and the decision-maker must resort to subjective considerations to choose
one person.
In conclusion, the ECJ attempted to establish a compromise position
concerning positive action while accepting that the Directive permits only
formal equality. Positive action is consistent with the Equal Treatment
Directive only when its purpose is to increase equal employment
opportunities for women. To do this a plan must allow a male candidate to
100. Id. at Conclusions of the Advocate General 29-32.
101. Id. at Conclusions of the Advocate General 29-32.
20041
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
show that hiring him is not the result of false stereotypes regarding men
and women but that the stereotypes are in fact true regarding him, e.g., that
he is the head of a household and its breadwinner. 02  Since these
stereotypes are likely often to be true, the ECJ, in interpreting the Directive,
did little to help women to achieve even limited equality of opportunity.
The Court did not question the assumption that positive action is
permissible only if it moves women "up to" a male standard. And thus it
could not even begin to craft a decision that addressed the issue whether
formal equality, which only moves women up to a male standard,
subordinates women to men.'
°3
Marschall and Kalanke have continued to influence subsequent
positive action cases before the Court. But subsequent legislative
developments have broadened the range of possibilities for positive action
in the EU. By contrast, the legal developments in the United States have
become increasingly hostile to affirmative action. Thus, it will be useful at
this point to compare EC law concerning positive action with selected
affirmative action decisions of American courts.
IV. American Affirmative Action Law
A. Overview
In previous articles, we have argued that the Marschall and Kalanke
positive action plans would likely be declared illegal by the United States
Supreme Court under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.104
Our main reason for speculating that the European positive action
plans would be declared illegal under U.S. law was that these plans were to
be effective until women held 50% of the jobs. The European plans were
triggered by a gross disparity between the percentages of male and female
job-holders, based on general population data without regard to the
102. A German court has held that the factors that may rebut the preference include
traditional secondary criteria. Clayton, supra note 95, at 448-49 n. 125.
103. Catherine MacKinnon, Introduction: The Art of the Impossible, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 1, 8-9 (1987).
104. Paul Hodapp, Steve Mazurana & Thomas Trelogan, Affirmative Action in Public
Employment: An International Comparison 11, in EUROPEAN STUDIES CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS: SELECTED PAPERS FROM 1993-1999, 171-84 (Odwarka and Stefancic eds.,
2001) (Equal Protection Clause); Paul Hodapp & Steve Mazurana, Affirmative Action in
Public Employment: An International Comparison 16 MIDWEST L. REv. 90 (1999) (Title
VII) (Hodapp).
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percentage of female applicants. American courts have held that such
broad comparisons are not probative of the need for remedial legislation.
General population comparisons are useful only in minimal-qualification,
entry-level positions, and not for jobs with specialized qualifications. 0 5
To understand how the U.S. courts have reached this position and
what other factors enter into a decision regarding the legality of affirmative
action plans, we shall summarize briefly the state of the law regarding
gender-based affirmative action plans under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Federal Constitution and then under Title VII.
B. The Equal Protection Clause
1. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that
"No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the law."' 1 6  In determining the constitutionality of
government discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, the U.S.
Supreme Court uses three standards to review government classifications.
In the area of economic and social legislation, the Court uses a rational
relationship analysis. The Court examines a governmental classification to
determine that it is a reasonable means to a legitimate government
purpose.10 7 This standard is highly deferential to the government's social
105. Hodapp, supra note 104, at 100-01. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) (stating that general population comparisons are only
useful, if at all, in the case of minimum qualification, entry-level positions and not for jobs
with special qualifications not possessed by the general population); Hill v. Ross, 186 F.3d
586, 590 (7th Cir.1999) (comparing the percentage of women in a particular job with the
percentage of women in the general population is statistical nonsense, because of the
assumption that, absent discrimination, group percentages in any job will mirror the general
population).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Judicial interpretation of the amendment created a
"state action" requirement that limits its effect to government entities. Thus, the amendment
does not protect one citizen from another citizen, but citizens from the government. See
generally Gerald L. Neuman, Equal Protection General Equality and Economic
Discrimination from a U.S. Perspective, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 281, 298 (1999). The Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution with its due process clause imposes the same equality
obligations on the federal government that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the
states. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
107. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 628-39
(13th ed. 1997) (stating that judicial formulations of the standard have varied from more to
less deferential to the legislature: from "a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation" to "any state of facts (that) reasonably can be conceived." Compare F. S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920) with Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). For a typical example of equal protection, pre-1960s tri-partite
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and economic classifications. 10 8
A second standard of review is strict scrutiny, which is used in
evaluating racial classifications among others. The classification must
have a compelling purpose and it must be narrowly tailored to achieve that
purpose. This review has often been fatal in fact for government
classifications. 109
A third standard of review is intermediate scrutiny, which is used for
gender classifications, among others. Gender classifications must serve an
important government interest and must be substantially related to the
achievement of that obj ective.110
In 1996, Justice Ginsburg, who had argued before the Court for a strict
scrutiny standard in gender classification cases,"' stated that intermediate
analysis, see Ry. Express Agency v. New York,, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
108. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-35 (1996).
109. GUNTHER, supra note 107, at 630 (stating that strict scrutiny is also used in cases
involving fundamental rights, e.g., voting, criminal appeals and interstate travel). Recent
examples of strict scrutiny in affirmative action cases are Adarand Constructors Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (race as a suspect class); Gratz v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 244,
156 L. Ed. 2d 257 (2003) (University of Michigan's points-based undergraduate admissions
policy, which automatically granted additional points to every 'underrepresented minority'
applicant, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause and Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); and Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306, L. Ed. 2d 304 (2003)
(narrowly tailored use, by the University of Michigan's Law School, of race in its
admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in the educational benefits of a diverse
student body did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause or Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act). The source of strict scrutiny lies in a footnote in United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends to seriously curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."). Although strict scrutiny is
often fatal in fact, the Court has never explicitly adopted a per se rule that all governmental
race-based classifications are per se invalid, that is, that the Constitution is "color-blind."
See generally GUNTHER, supra note 107, at 644, 670.
110. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The concurring and dissenting opinions use
some form of the rational relation standard. The source of the Court's reasoning for
intermediate scrutiny is Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, (1973). Justice Brennan
argued unsuccessfully that gender was a suspect classification on the grounds of the
country's long history of sex discrimination that put women "not on a pedestal, but in a
cage." Women, like blacks, have been subject to stereotypes that denied them the right to
hold political office, serve on juries, bring lawsuits, own property, and vote. And, women
still face pervasive, invidious discrimination based on an immutable characteristic that bears
no relation to ability and subjects women to a lower status. By contrast, Justice Scalia has
difficulties with women as a "'discrete and insular minorit[y]' unable to employ the
'political processes ordinarily to be relied upon,' when they constitute a majority of the
electorate. And the suggestion that they are incapable of exerting that political power
smacks of the same paternalism that the Court so roundly condemns." United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Carey Olney, Better Bitch than Mouse: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Feminism and VM1,
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scrutiny requires an "exceedingly persuasive justification."'1 2  Her
language raised the question of whether the Court was abandoning
intermediate scrutiny in gender classification cases in favor of strict
scrutiny. Although the question remains open," 3 our conclusion is that
courts will continue to apply intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications
until the Court clearly holds that the standard has changed.' 
14
A question of more immediate importance to understanding
intermediate scrutiny is how the Court has applied that test. A review of its
gender discrimination decisions shows that the Court is willing to permit
laws that are intended to compensate women for past economic
discrimination. For example, in Kahn... the Court allowed a property tax
exemption for widows but not widowers. The Court rejected the argument
9 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 97, 110-15, 123-24 (2001) (noting that some of the harshest criticism
of her position that women should be elevated to meet the male standard comes from
dominance theorists like Catherine MacKinnon who believe that the authentic voice of
women is suppressed by a patriarchal society). See, e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 107, at 716-
17 (discussing whether it is constitutionally permissible for states to act on a belief with a
"measure of truth" that women have a different attitude or "voice" than men).
112. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533-34 (1996). Justice Ginsburg is suspicious of the neat
packages of the three types of scrutiny. She has stated that the formulation of intermediate
scrutiny is that gender-based discrimination will not be permitted unless the state provides
an exceedingly persuasive justification for the difference in treatment and the difference
does not rely on stereotyped generalizations regarding women. Ruth Bader Ginsburg &
Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 1
RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 193, 212-13, 225-26 (1999) (noting that Marschall is sensitive to
unconscious bias which continues to be a problem in the U.S. where "[t]he natural
inclination of predominately white male middle managers is to hire and promote one of their
own.").
113. Olney, supra note 111, at 148-65.
114. Some authorities argue that the Court is moving toward a higher standard for
gender classifications than traditional intermediate scrutiny. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 573 (J.
Scalia, dissenting); Montgomery v. Carr, 101 F.3d 1117, 1123 (6th Cir. 1996); Jason
Skaggs, Justifying Gender Based Affirmative Action under U.S. v. Virginia's "Exceedingly
Persuasive Justification" Standard, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1174, 1196-1209 (1998). Four
circuit courts use intermediate scrutiny in all gender classification cases, including
affirmative action. The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals uses strict scrutiny for gender-based
affirmative action cases. The author argues for using the "exceedingly persuasive
justification" standard for all gender-based classifications, because, in part, gender should
face a lower level of scrutiny than race which is a more dangerous classification. Some
commentators argue that including women as a suspect class "may ultimately hurt women
by restricting their exercise of legislative power in gender-specific ways to foster women's
equality." Tracy Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1675
(1997).
115. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Now-Justice Ginsburg argued this case and
lost. She argued that the decision ignores "the provision's roots in women's role as
subservient spouse," because the law did not apply the small tax exemption to divorced
women or single heads of households, women who because of past discrimination might be
most in need of compensation. Ginsburg, supra note 112, at 213.
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that the classification of all widows, but not widowers, as needy was a
stereotype that harmed women. Instead, the Court applied a deferential
rational relation test because a tax statute was involved and upheld the
statute as a permissible remedy for past discrimination. The dissent argued
that the statute was under-inclusive because wealthy widows received the
benefit of the statute and that a 90-year-old statute could not have intended
to remedy discrimination against women.
In Webster,'1 6 the Court upheld a statute that allowed women to
calculate their average monthly wage in a way that gave them higher
retirement benefits than men. The Court held that the statute was clearly
compensatory without any accompanying harmful stereotypes.
In Virginia, which opened the doors of the formerly all-male Virginia
Military Institute to women, the Court recognized that some affirmative
action is necessary to compensate women for the economic disadvantages
they have suffered and to enable them to achieve equality of opportunity to
compete with men. Then women will be able to remove for themselves the
last remnants of economic disability.'
17
2. Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Dep 't.
A recent example of the use of intermediate scrutiny in evaluating an
affirmative action plan designed to compensate women for the continuing
effects of discrimination is Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Dep't. "18 There
the parties agreed to the application of the intermediate standard that the
court interpreted as follows. First, remedying past discrimination in society
against women is an important government objective. Second, the
government must present sufficient probative evidence of discrimination,
but its evidence need not be as strong as that required in strict scrutiny
cases. Third, gender-based affirmative action need not be the
government's last resort to remedy discrimination. " 9
At issue in the case was the affirmative action plan of the county fire
department that gave preferential treatment to women in hiring for entry-
level firefighter positions. Men who unsuccessfully applied for these
positions challenged the county's long term hiring goal of 36% women as
unreasonably high. The objection to the fire department's long-term goal
was that it was not substantially related to the department's legitimate
interest in remedying discrimination. Specifically, the objection was that
116. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
117. Virginia, 51 U.S. 515 at 432-33.
118. 253 F.3d 1288 (llth Cir. 2001).
119. Id. at 1294-95.
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the 36% figure was based on general population figures. The department
arrived at this number by first determining that women constituted 52% of
the county's population. It then discounted this number by 30% because
not all women are interested in becoming, or physically able to be,
firefighters.
120
Certain facts in the case were undisputed. The fire department had
excluded women from firefighting positions until the late 1970s or early
1980s. In 1983, the department was only 1% female while the general
population of the county was 52% female. The county was unsuccessful in
recruiting female firefighters because of its history of discrimination.
Then, the county required preferential hiring for women as part of its
voluntary affirmative action plan. 21 By 1994-97, the period when the
complaining male applicants were not hired, the percentage of entry-level
female firefighters went from 8. 89% to 11. 6%.122
The court's reasoning recognized that the government is not permitted
to rely on general population figures, especially where more refined data
existed that more closely approximated the qualified labor pool., 23 The key
question was what percentage of women in the county were able and
willing to be firefighters. The male applicants introduced statistics that
suggested that between 16 and 22% of the women in the county were able
and willing to be firefighters. They argued, on the basis of these numbers,
that the 36% goal for hiring female firefighters was unreasonable. The
court disagreed. It held that a gap of 4-10% between the percent of women
in the department (12%) in 1997 and the plaintiff's own estimate of what
the percentage of women should have been (16-22%) was sufficient
evidence that the plan was substantially related to the goal of reducing
discrimination under the intermediate scrutiny standard.
12 4
The court was troubled by the admission of the department that the
goal of 36% was unrealistic and probably unattainable, even in 15-20 years.
In fact, the actual percentage of women hired each year was 25%.
Nevertheless, that 25% figure was only 3% above the range of plaintiffs'
estimate of the proper hiring goal. Nevertheless, the court opined that the
plan might be successfully challenged in subsequent litigation, because its
stated goal of 36% was so unrealistic that the plan could not be designed as
120. Id. at 1289, 1295 n.5.
121. Id. at 1290-91.
122. Id. at 1296.
123. Id. at 1295-96.
124. Id. at 1295-98.
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a temporary means to remedy past discrimination.121
The duration of an affirmative action plan is an important
consideration in evaluating the plan. A valid plan must be designed to
attain-and not to maintain indefinitely-a balanced workforce. Courts
reason that a permanent plan is more likely to affect negatively the
legitimate interests of men in the workplace.
126
Judge Hand used his concurring opinion 127 to argue that affirmative
action law is an example of what is wrong with American society. "We
have developed an overweening desire in our approach to societal issues to
try to make all things perfect through the use of law.. .We allow ourselves
to be involved in social engineering which is, at best, not an exact science
and rarely succeeds in solving its honest intents.' 28 The judge would limit
the law to ensuring "any who are confronted with it that they will have
equal opportunity to or for justice."'' 29  Any attempt by the law to go
beyond this limited goal is "meddling" and "micro management" that will
lead to the "loss of individual freedom.' 30  The judge was particularly
concerned because in this case the county stated during oral argument that
it had ceased to discriminate. Thus, for the judge, it was axiomatic that
affirmative action was an unjustified attempt by the government to reach a
"perceived balance."13'
This judge's opinion is similar to the concurring opinions of justices
Scalia and Thomas of the Supreme Court in Adarand, a case where the
Court rejected a race-based affirmative action plan using the strict scrutiny
standard. Both justices argued that constitutionally there is only one race,
American, and that benign discrimination, such as affirmative action, is as
obnoxious as malicious prejudice.132 All three judges accept the narrowest
notion of formal equality that permits a difference in treatment only to
125. Id. at 1298, 1301-02.
126. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 635-39 (1987) (Title VII). The
county's affirmative action plan in Danskine was challenged under both the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Danskine, 253 F.3d at 1289.
127. Danskine, 253 F.3d at 1301-02.
128. Id. at 1302.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 515 U.S. at 237-38. Some commentators believe that no racial classification can
survive the Adarand test of Scalia and Thomas, who believe that the Constitution does not
recognize "group-based remedies," because there are no debtor/creditor races in the
Constitution and that there is no "benign discrimination." GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND
REMEDIES 55-56 (2000).
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compensate identifiable victims of purposeful discrimination by an
identifiable perpetrator.
Previously, we showed how the European Union's positive action
position had moved beyond this narrow conception in order to reduce the
systematic discrimination that women suffer there. We have noted the
evidence that women in the U.S. also continue to suffer from systematic
discrimination. We have argued in this paper that positive action is a
reasonable means to achieve substantive equality for women. And,
Danskine illustrates the dilemma women face if individual discrimination
cases are the sole means to remedy past discrimination and to achieve
"equal opportunity to or for justice." In Danskine the court found evidence
of the effects of past discrimination, which the county was trying to
remedy. But, the county was not prepared to admit continuing
discrimination. The past victims of discrimination are time-barred. The
present victims face a vigorous defense and expensive litigation. How will
the equality of opportunity the dissenting judge seeks be achieved? The
impossibility of women's pursuit of fairness through individual litigation
must be recognized in light of the increased acceptance of a right of an
employer to associate with whomever he pleases, without regard to other
social values such as equality.
133
C. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964134
The U.S. Supreme Court has never decided the constitutionality of a
public employer's gender-based affirmative action plan under the Equal
Protection Clause. But, it upheld a public employer's voluntary gender-
based affirmative action plan under Title VII in Johnson v. Transportation
Agency. 
135
The facts of that case were that a male employee (Johnson) and a
female employee (Joyce) of the Transportation Agency of Santa Clara
County both applied for a promotion to the position of road dispatcher.
The Agency and the County had adopted voluntary affirmative action plans
that permitted gender to be used as a factor in employment decisions
involving traditionally segregated job classifications where women were
significantly under-represented. The Agency's hiring procedures allowed it
to hire any candidate from the top seven candidates for a position. Johnson
133. See Hasnas, supra note 70, at 430-33.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1964). The relation between the legal standards of
Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause has never been definitively resolved, although it
appears clear that the standards are not identical. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S.
616, 632 (1987); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1989).
135. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641-42.
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and Joyce were among the top seven candidates for the road dispatcher
position.
Johnson had scored higher after an initial interview, and he scored
first after a second interview with Agency supervisors, who recommended
that he be promoted. Joyce complained about the hiring process, in part
because one of the interviewing supervisors had described her as a "rebel-
rousing, skirt-wearing person." The Agency had no female skilled
employees and no woman had ever been employed as a road dispatcher.
The director of the Agency considered these facts and promoted Joyce.
The trial court found for Johnson but the Ninth Circuit reversed. 36
The Supreme Court held that the same standard for legitimate
affirmative action plans applies to private and public employers under Title
VII and that the Agency plan met those standards. 
37
The requirements for a valid affirmative action plan under Title VII
are as follows. (1) The male and female candidate must be qualified for the
position. (2) There must be a conspicuous imbalance of women in the
traditionally segregated job at issue. (3) The plan must be temporary. And,
(4) the plan must not unnecessarily trammel rights of males or create an
absolute bar to their job advancement 138
The most significant issue for some members of the Court was the
required degree of fault of the employer.' 39 Johnson argued that there was
136. Id. at 619-26. See also, Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 770 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.1985).
The trial court found that Johnson was the most qualified candidate, that the Agency was not
guilty of purposeful discrimination, and that the Agency's plan was not temporary because it
contained no termination date by which a balanced workforce had to be achieved. The
Ninth Circuit held that the Agency was not required to prove its own past discriminatory
conduct because there was evidence of a conspicuous imbalance of women in its workforce.
The court also ruled that the plan was temporary. We question the finding of the trial court
that Johnson was the most qualified candidate. The Agency rules did not require a
determination of the most qualified candidate. Instead, the Agency director could choose
one candidate from the seven most qualified candidates. The amicus curiae brief of the
American Society of Personnel Administration questioned whether the notion of best
qualified makes sense for semi-skilled positions, especially where, as in this case, the
interview scores are not objectively verified. American Society for Personnel
Administration as Amicus Curiae at 9-10, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (No. 85-1129).
The appeals court did not discuss the trial court's qualification finding. Johnson, 770 F.2d
752.
137. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 642.
138. Id. at 630. See also United Steelworkers of America, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
139. Justice O'Connor took a narrow view of permissible plans and would require
evidence of discrimination by an employer that would satisfy a prima-facie case. Johnson,
480 U.S. at 637-47 (arguing that the absence of any female road dispatchers would meet the
prima-facie test). Justice Scalia, in his dissent, stated that most important proposition of the
case was that "sexual discrimination is permitted under Title VII when it is intended to
overcome the effect, not of the employer's own discrimination, but of societal attitudes that
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no evidence in the record regarding the number of women who applied for
skilled positions with the Agency and no evidence of the number of women
in the qualified labor pool for skilled positions. Thus, there was not
sufficient evidence in the record that the Agency had discriminated against
women. The Agency countered that women had not applied for skilled
positions because of the employer's history of discrimination. It pointed to
anecdotal evidence that women were denied training given to men, that
work was assigned to women because of male supervisors' feeling about
what work was appropriate for women, and that an early job description for
road dispatchers was written to refer only to men. 40 A legitimate voluntary
affirmative action plan does not require a finding of intentional
discrimination by the employer, but in any case, given the evidence, Justice
Scalia's suggestion in his dissent, that there was no discrimination on the
part of the employer, was mistaken. There was evidence of the employee's
past intentional discrimination.
Precedent did require that the plan be temporary and the Agency plan
had no specific termination date. However, the plan stated that its long-
term goal was to achieve a work force reflecting the gender composition of
the area work force. Short-term goals were established so that the Agency
could measure its yearly improvement in its long-term goals. According to
the Court, this evidence was sufficient to meet the temporary
requirement. 1
41
Because Johnson had no entitlement to the road dispatcher position
and he remained free to apply for future promotions, the Court held that the
plan did not unnecessarily trammel his rights. Also the plan did not set
aside places for women or prevent men and women from competing for
positions. "No persons are automatically excluded from consideration; all
are able to have their qualifications weighed against those of other
applicants. 142
Justice Scalia's dissent in Johnson has been said "to epitomize the
conservative opposition to affirmative action." 143 His argument is based on
have limited the entry of... a particular sex, into certain jobs." Id. at 664.
140. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 7-10, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (No.85-1129);
Brief of Respondent Transportation Agency at 7-8, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (No. 85-
1129).
141. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 635-39.
142. Id.at637-38.
143. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, AFIRMATIVE ACTION ON TRIAL: SEX DISCRIMINATION IN
JOHNSON V. SANTA CLARA 160 (Peter C. Hoffer & N.E. H. eds., 1996). The author reports
that little has changed at the Transportation Agency. Id. at 180-81. Ms. Joyce is still a
dispatcher but continues to feel the resentment of many male co-workers. Id. Mr. Johnson
is retired. id. In 1989 he sent out an "Open Letter to the White Males of America"
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the following points. First, the plain language of Title VII clearly prohibits
any sex discrimination in employment, which includes affirmative action
plans like those of the Transportation Agency. Second, this plan did not
remedy discrimination because there was no prior sex discrimination to
remedy. Third, the trial court had found that Johnson was better qualified
than Joyce and thus he was an innocent victim of discrimination who had
been denied a promotion he had fairly won. Fourth, without evidence of
specific and egregious discrimination, the majority had embarked on social
engineering that had the unattainable goal of reshaping every workforce to
mirror the overall population. 144
These arguments are similar to the objections of the dissenting judge
in Danskine, and our response is also similar. Both sets of arguments are
based on an ideological reading of the case. In fact, the Transportation
Agency never had any female dispatchers. There was anecdotal evidence
of the discriminatory attitudes there. And, the trial court concluded on the
basis of selective evidence that Johnson was better qualified than Joyce.
Finally, subsequent information that little has changed for women at the
Agency since the time of the decision militates against the charge of social
engineering.
U.S. courts are clearly divided on the issue of affirmative action, as
are the judges and advocates-general in the European Court. There, recent
legislative changes have sought to break the deadlock in a way favorable to
positive action, but in America the history of affirmative action, especially
its recent history, shows a turn away from affirmative action.
D. History of Affirmative Action in the U.S. 145
President Kennedy's Executive Order 10925 in 1961 mandated federal
contractors to "take affirmative action to ensure that the applicants are
employed, and are treated during employment, without regard to race,
creed, color or national origin." 146 The program was voluntary.
In 1965 President Johnson, without much public comment, issued
Executive Order 11246 to ensure that federal contractors used more
minority contractors and took pre-contract steps to hire and promote more
suggesting they organize before they lost more of their rights. Id.
144. Id. at 160-63.
145. Because of the brevity of this discussion, we refer the reader to the more detailed
account in Peter Schuck's Affirmative Action: Past, Present and Future. 20 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 47-54 (2002).
146. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
147. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
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minority employees. His justification was that "you do not take a person
who for years has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to
the starting line of a race and then say, 'You're free to compete with others'
and justly believe that you have been completely fair."'147 In 1967, women
were added to the protected groups, and specific goals and timetables for
the prompt achievement of full and equal employment opportunity were
required in 1968.
In 1970, President Nixon demanded workforce percentages with
specific target ranges for certain federal contractors. In 1977, under
President Carter, Congress approved a 10% set-aside for minorities under
the Public Works Employment Act. But, beginning in 1980, President
Reagan sought the abolition of all affirmative action, primarily through
judicial appointments. President Clinton favored limited affirmative action
but not quotas. Even after the Adarand decision struck down a federal
race-conscious affirmative action plan under the strict scrutiny standard,
President Clinton still allowed procurement preferences where there was
evidence of discrimination in particular industries.
Finally, two states, Washington and California, have recently adopted
ballot initiatives invalidating racial preferences in public employment and
education.
E. Similarities and Differences in Positive/Affirmative Action Law in
Europe and the United States.
First, both courts emphasize that justified plans remove stereotypes
that stand as obstacles for the equal opportunity of women to compete with
men. Justified plans may use sex as a decision-making factor but absolute
quotas are forbidden.
The differences are that American experiences made the United States
begin with slavery and race-conscious classifications and only
subsequently turn to gender-based classifications.1 48 By contrast, the EC
begins with gender discrimination. As a result of the continuing struggle to
148. See Ann Shalleck, Revisting Equality: Feminist Thought about Intermediate
Scrutiny, 6 J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 31 (1997) (some women are symbolically
committed to strict scrutiny for gender classifications, because it is the highest level
available in equal protection analysis). However, the Court may be collapsing together the
levels of review, strict scrutiny and rational relation review, because rational relation review
is becoming stricter and strict scrutiny milder. Donna Matthews, Avoiding Gender Equality,
19 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 127, 144 (1998) (arguing that women are a suspect class, even
though they are not a "discrete and insular minority" because "women are still largely
excluded from political and economic power").
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free the United States from the effects of slavery, Americans remain
suspicious of racial discrimination. By contrast, EC gender discrimination
law began with an economic agreement against equal pay discrimination,
within Member States still organized around traditional male-female family
roles. For example, until 1976, the German Civil Code listed a wife's
primary responsibility as keeping house, and German tax codes favored
households where the husband was the primary breadwinner. 1
49
Second, American courts use fixed categories of judicial review,
which virtually determine the result in particular cases. By contrast, the
ECJ has established a permissible goal for positive action based on EC
legislation.
Third, the proceedings before the U.S. courts are adversarial, while the
preliminary ruling proceedings are not adversarial. Fourth, recent
legislation in the EC has strengthened positive action, while American
legislation has recently invalidated affirmative action.
In light of these similarities and differences, we agree that the EC "has
made it easier for women to benefit from voluntary gender-based
affirmative action programs" than has the United States.150 We shall now
examine four recent ECJ judgments to determine if the promise has been
fulfilled.
149. Rozof, supra note 31 at 1505.
150. Arnie Needham, Level the Playing Field: Affirmative Action in the European
Union, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 479, 481, 493-96 (2000) (The ECJ allows
positive action when candidates are equally qualified and are given individual consideration.
The Supreme Court does not require the employer to give employees an individualized
consideration but does require the Court to balance the rights of women with the rights of
males. The ECJ approach, which stresses individualized consideration, "ends the portrayal
of women as employees unjustifiably gaining from quotas" by employers who automatically
hire women to forestall future litigation. The ECJ approach also emphasizes unconscious
discriminatory stereotypes. This approach allows the Court to recognize that under-
representation of women is due to "structural elements which are extremely difficult to
tackle using only traditional anti-discrimination legislation." By contrast, American courts
emphasize intentional discrimination and the fault of the individual defendant/employer).
For an earlier and more positive perspective on American affirmative action, see SANDRA
FEDMAN, WOMEN AND THE LAW 393 (1997) (clear trend of U.S. Supreme Court justices is in
favor of substantive equality that rejects individualism and endorses a social responsibility
of the state to take positive action to aid women).
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V. Four Recent Positive Action Judgments of the ECJ
A. Badeck
1. The First Issue.
The government of the Land Hesse required that its administrative
departments eliminate under-representation of women. Each department
had to develop an advancement plan for women that required equally
qualified women to be offered jobs until women filled at least one-half of
all jobs. An exception existed if reasons of greater weight rebutted the
preference for the female candidate. The plans were valid for two years or
until the number of female employees equaled or exceeded the number of
male employees for each particular job group. 151 Some 46 members of the
Hesse legislature challenged the positive action plan as contrary to the
Equal Treatment Directive. The Hesse Constitutional Court sought a
preliminary ruling from the ECJ interpreting the Directive with respect to
this plan.
152
The ECJ cited both Article 2 of the Equal Treatment Directive and
Article 119(4) of the Treaty of Amsterdam as relevant legal authority. But,
it stated that it would rely on the Treaty "only if the court considers that art.
2 precludes national legislation such as that at issue in the main
proceedings.'5 3  The ECJ applied its principles from the Kalanke and
151. Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875, 7-9. "Law of the Land of Hesse on equal rights
for women and men and the removal of discrimination against women in the public
administration." Id. 1-14. Paragraph 1 states the aim is "equal access of women and men
to posts in the public service, by the adoption of advancement plans relating to conditions of
access and promotion for women and their working conditions, with binding targets." Id.
1. The plans were initiated in 1993 and will exist through 2006. The ECJ refers to the plan
as using "flexible result quotas" because the targets are not fixed uniformly for all
departments and all decisions. That is, there is no tie-breaker that favors women
automatically. Id. 28. In our view, these are not quotas but timetables and goals that are
contained in "advancement plans," a less controversial phrase used in the Hesse legislation.
The distinction between "advancement plans" or "equality plans" in Badeck and the
"decision quotas" in Kalanke and Marschall is important. Equality plans which are newer
are more likely to be accepted because they are less likely to be perceived as requiring a
decision favoring women. Colneric, supra note 83, at 241-45.
152. Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875, 10-12.
153. Id 3-6, 14. AG Saggio argued in his opinion that the new amendment to the
Treaty requires a broad interpretation of EC equality law that allows positive action when
gender-based disadvantages cannot be remedied in any other way. Id. j 26-27. We have
argued previously that the Treaty goes even farther and allows positive action under three
different justifications, including when it is likely to be helpful to women to achieve
equality. The Court also referred to the Council Recommendation of 1984 on the promotion
of positive action for women.
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Marschall judgments to determine that these positive action plans are
consistent with the Directive. The Court first considered whether the plan
in general was consistent with the Directive and then considered four
specific parts of the legislation.
The Court stressed that the plan allowed for individualized
consideration of all candidates. Such selection criteria as family work,
seniority and age, and date of the last promotion are to be individually
considered but only insofar as they are important for the "suitability,
performance and capability" of candidates, and such selection criteria as
family status and income of a partner are immaterial.154 And, part-time
work and delays in training while caring for dependents may not have a
negative effect on a candidate's evaluation. 55 Also, the law allowed that
"reasons of greater weight" may oppose the selection of women.' 56 These
include preferences for the disabled, part-time employees, certain public
sector employees, and the long-term unemployed to rebut the preference
for women. Thus the plan was consistent with Marschall and the
Directive.
2. Comparison with the U.S. Supreme Court.
In comparing ECJ judgments and Supreme Court decisions, we noted
earlier that the plans in Kalanke and Marschall would likely be held
unconstitutional under the American Equal Protection Clause and thought
to violate Title VII. European plans with their 50% goals are not
sufficiently closely tied to the government's legitimate goal in reducing
social discrimination against women for an American court. American
courts have consistently held that broad comparisons between the number
of women in a particular job and general population data are not probative
evidence of the need for remedial legislation. 57 According to American
courts it is unrealistic to assume that women will seek employment in the
same proportion as their representation in the general population.
158
154. Id. I 10.
155 Id. , 31-33, at 1-1890-92. The legislation is clearly intended to achieve
substantive equality rather than only formal equality "by reducing the inequalities which
may occur in practice in social life." Id. One commentator believes that the Court in
Badeck abandoned the formal equality principle that set equality of opportunity against
equality of result. Kristina Kuchhold, Badeck: The Third German Reference on Positive
Action, 30 INDuS. L.J. 116, 119 (2001).
156. Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875, 34-35, at 1-1893 (The Prime Minister identified
these preferences in response to a written question from the Court).
157. Engineering Contractors Ass'n v. Metro Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 908-10 (11 th
Cir. 1997).
158. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08, 551 (1989).
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The distinction between European equality plans with timetables for
large organization units and American decision quotas that favor women in
individual decisions explains why the Europeans use the 50% goal. The
comprehensiveness of the plans considered by the ECJ contrasts with the
plans for specific jobs evaluated by American courts. In Badeck, the ECJ
first examined the entire positive action plan required in all departments.
By contrast, because of the adversarial nature of individual discrimination
cases in the U.S., in Danskine and Johnson the courts were considering an
affirmative action plan limited to just one position. The European 50%
goal makes more sense when a large number of jobs in different sectors and
grades of public service are considered. Women may not be interested in a
particular government job, but given the vast array of government jobs only
a principled libertarian would reject a job just because it was a government
job.
One may challenge our attempt to compare European and American
decisions on the ground that ECJ judgments are not based on the extensive
evidentiary record that is required in U.S. affirmative action cases. We
recognize the importance of the difference but believe that discussing the
reasons for the difference is important in understanding the reasoning of the
two courts.
First, American courts implicitly assume that only some women have
been disadvantaged by discrimination. Women who are not interested in or
qualified for a position cannot have been harmed by discriminatory
decisions concerning that position. For American courts, social
discrimination does not refer to the pervasive network of systematic gender
discrimination. Instead, the courts assume a model of methodological
individualism. Social discrimination is the sum total of individual acts of
discrimination that are intended by an individual employer and that harm
an individual woman. The Equal Treatment Directive requires that
permissible positive action remove existing inequalities that affect
women's opportunities. Thus, for both courts permissible positive or
affirmative action may remedy actual inequalities. The difference is that
the European Equal Treatment Directive uses the plural to describe these
inequalities. They affect women's opportunities - not only a particular
woman's opportunities. Thus, the ECJ has been inclined to accept attempts
by Member States to remove women's inequalities without evidence that
(30% of government contracts were reserved for minority businesses because 30% was
midway between the percent of minority contractors and the percent of minorities in the
area). Compare United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 179, 182 (1987) (the Court
permitted a race-conscious hiring floor of 50% in order to quickly achieve 25% black
representation among police officers).
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specific women have been injured by a specific discriminatory decision.
A similar point may be made using the concept of fault in
discrimination law. The need to establish fault or intentional
discrimination is central to American discrimination law but not to EC
law. 59  Remedying social discrimination is a legitimate government
purpose under intermediate scrutiny. Nevertheless there must be some
evidence of fault on the part of the individual government employer,
namely, evidence that the government employer has itself been guilty of
discrimination. However, the justices of the Supreme Court divided on the
degree of fault of the employer required to make a gender-based
affirmative action plan permissible. The justices' positions range from the
manifest imbalance requirement, to evidence of a prima-facie case, to proof
of intentional discrimination.
The American courts' use of the qualified labor pool as the
comparator to determine if a manifest imbalance exists incorporates the
fault concept. To illustrate this point, we shall use numbers from the
Danskine decision. There the employer had a workforce in which only one
percent of its employees were women. The employer then created an
affirmative action plan requiring that 36% of entry-level hires be women.
This percentage was based on general population figures, discounted
because of a belief that some women would not be interested or qualified
for these positions. Certainly if 36% of the hires should be women and the
employer has only 1% female employees, it is reasonable to assume that
the employer bears some fault for not having hired qualified female
applicants. It must have known that it was not hiring enough women, given
the qualified labor pool. Even if its reputation for discriminating against
women caused women not to apply for positions, given the huge disparity,
the employer should have recognized that something was wrong in its
failure to hire qualified women.
If the 36% figure is not sufficiently realistic to show a manifest
imbalance, i.e., some fault on the part of the employer, then the affirmative
action plan cannot be justified. The 36% goal would not be realistic if, for
example, 12% of the hires were women and only 16% of qualified
applicants were women. Under this situation the employer would not be so
clearly at fault for not hiring the full 16% of qualified female applicants.
By contrast, the European Court is not required to find employer fault
before allowing it to take reasonable steps to remedy societal
discrimination. It need only show a legitimate end and a proportional
means, that is, the means must fit with the end sought by the legislation.
159. See discussion at note 150.
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Badeck supports our hypothesis that the ECJ is more likely to allow
positive action plans to assist women in employment. However, the
European analysis might seem problematic to the American courts when
applied only to specific jobs. Imagine, for example, that a positive action
plan sets a decision quota for a specific job of 50% women. There are
three women applicants and eight men. There are three openings for a
particular job, and the other three positions are already held by men. Then,
absent considerations that rebut the female preference, all of the female
applicants are hired and none of the men are hired. Under these
circumstances, what sense is there in saying that these men had an equal
opportunity to compete with the female candidates?
To an American court, the way the European courts would deal with
this case shows that the European goal of equal representation for women
in the workplace is not consistent with equal opportunity for men and
women.
The European Court might respond to such a reaction by situating
such a case in its historical context. The Court recognizes that there are
significant social stereotypes that continue to keep women from competing
equally in the workforce. These barriers are in part responsible for the
presence of only three qualified female applicants but eight qualified male
applicants. The European Court addresses these barriers across all
government jobs. As a result, the percentage of women in the entire
workforce is likely to mirror the percentage of women in the population.
Another possible European response would invoke the legitimacy of
democratic procedures. The cases discussed in this paper all involve public
employers in democratic societies. American courts are suspicious of
government and increasingly favor relying on the free market to resolve
such social problems as gender inequality rather than adopting a
government program of affirmative action. Thus, government employers
are not free to use affirmative action unless they are prepared to provide
sufficient evidence that affirmative action is justified, because affirmative
action is viewed as inconsistent with market principles of individual merit
and efficiency.
1 60
By contrast, the EC law allows a democratic government to balance
the interests of different groups of citizens so long as it acts with objective
reasons that any citizen can recognize. Three of these reasons are codified
in the Treaty of Amsterdam. A Member State may provide assistance to
160. Heather Nelson, Fatal in Fact?, 21 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 151, 158-59 (2000)
(quoting Nancy Gertner, Der Kampf gegen Diskimminierung mit Hilfe des Gesetzes, BERLTN
J. SOZIOL. S. 7-27 (1992)).
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under-represented groups, it may take steps to prevent disadvantages in the
professional life of members of under-represented groups, and it may
compensate members of under-represented groups for disadvantages they
suffer in their professional lives. 16' And thus it may define what constitutes
under-representation in terms of general population figures so long as its
definition is reasonably related to the three goals. Democratically enacted
positive or affirmative action is not unfair or contrary to the free market,
because equality of chances to compete is a necessary condition for the
legitimacy of the competitive free market.
162
But there is a suggestion in Badeck that the U.S. analysis of
affirmative cases may be influencing the ECJ and thus the differences
between the courts on this issue may become smaller.
Advocate-General Saggio relied on the new additions to EC equality
law to argue for changes in ECJ interpretation of EC equality law that
would bring EC law closer to American law. But, these changes are not in
accord with the progressive elements in the Treaty of Amsterdam. In his
opinion, he initially proposed a progressive reinterpretation of EC positive
action law. He argued that the Court's strict interpretation of the Equal
Treatment Directive article 2(4) that creates an exception to equal treatment
is inconsistent with the development of EU law. His specific proposal,
however, is far from progressive. He argues that substantive equality is not
completely incompatible with formal equality when a Member State has
determined that formal equality of opportunity cannot remedy actual
inequalities and thus equality of results is required. 163 A second condition
necessary to justify positive action is that it not excessively impinge on the
rights of men and that it not be disproportionate to the real needs of
women.
In effect, he has adopted two conditions that American judges will
recognize. The first condition is similar to the strict scrutiny standard that
requires that a government have exhausted all other means of remedying
discrimination before adopting an affirmative action plan. 164 The second
condition is similar to the requirement in Title VII affirmative action cases
that a plan not unnecessarily trammel the legitimate interests of innocent
males. 6
5
161. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 12, arts. 141(1), 141(4).
162. Hodapp, supra note 104, at 99-100.
163. Badeck, E.C.R. 1-1875, 26-27.
164. Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237-38 (1995).
165. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 637-38 (1987). In Johnson the Court
decided that the affirmative action plan did not violate this condition, because Johnson could
be a candidate for future promotions and he had no legal entitlement to a promotion to the
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However, pace the AG, nothing in the Treaty requires the adoption of
these restrictive conditions from American law. We would favor the
American courts' looking to the European cases that favor positive action
for guidance in reevaluating American equal protection law, rather than the
other way round.
66
3. The Remaining Issues in Badeck
The remaining issues before the ECJ in Badeck can be evaluated more
quickly, 167 for it appears that the Court was merely permitting established
European practices. A second provision of the Hesse legislation provided
binding targets for certain academic positions that had to be filled with the
same proportion of women as the proportion of women who had received
training in the field.1 68  The ECJ approved the plan because instead of
creating an absolute quota, it created a flexible quota related to the number
of women trained for the position at any given time.
It may seem that the application of the concept of flexibility has
changed from the Marschall judgment. There "flexibility" referred to the
opportunity of male candidates to rebut the preference. Here "flexibility"
refers to the relativity of the quota to a changing number of persons trained
for the position. But, in both cases "flexibility" refers to the absence of a
specific number of women who are required to be hired for a position. The
key point is that in both situations the number of women actually hired is
established either by objective reasons that rebut the presumption favoring
women or by a determination of the number of trained women who are
specific position at issue.
166. Justice Ginsburg has stated that comparative analysis is relevant in discrimination
cases because discrimination is an infection throughout the world that we must all work to
eradicate. Ginsburg, supra note 112, at 224-30. She has compared Marschall with U.S.
Supreme Court decisions on two bases. See id. First, Marschall is similar to the Bakke
decision, by Justice Powell, in its emphasis on individual decision-making instead of
automatic preferences for women. Id. Second, the ECJ shows more sensitivity to
unconscious biases in employers' decisions by recognizing that mere tie-breakers allow
biases against women to affect the final employment decision. Id. See also Mark Tushnet,
The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1228 (1999)
(stating that U.S. courts can gain insight from constitutional experience elsewhere). In
addition, Justices O'Connor and Breyer have stated that they may consider ECJ decisions.
E. Greathous, Justices See Joint Issues with the EU, WASH. POST, July 9, 1998, at A24.
However, the Court has stated that comparative analysis is inappropriate in constitutional
cases. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 n.ll (1997). The Advocate-General in
Kalanke referred to U.S. discrimination law in his opinion, paragraphs 8, notes 8, 9, and 10.
Kalanke, 1995 ECR 1-305 1, 8 nn. 8-10.
167. Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875, 39-67.
168. At least four German states have binding prescriptions favoring the hiring of
women for certain academic positions. PETERS, supra note 50, at 134.
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available for the position.
From an American perspective, the fit between the proportion of
qualified trainees and the proportion of women hired for a position is closer
to the legitimate government interest in reducing social discrimination than
the 50% goal described by the ECJ in its handling of the first issue in
Badeck. Thus, given the flexibility of the substantial-relation prong of the
intermediate scrutiny test, our opinion is that this type of plan might
withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
A third provision of the Hesse law required that at least one-half of all
training places be allocated to women. The ECJ allowed the plan, by
distinguishing between training and hiring. In addition, the law applied
only to training that was not exclusively provided by the state. Thus, no
man was entirely excluded from training because it was available in the
private sector. 69  It is possible that the Court considered this quota as
flexible on the ground that the proportion of women who fill any public
training position is not absolute but is relative to the number of men who
purchase private training.
The distinction between the use of quotas in training decisions and
their use in employment decisions is widely accepted in Germany. Quotas
for women who are minimally qualified for training, but not as well
qualified as the men who are seeking training, are considered permissible,
though such quotas are not accepted for employment decisions. One
reason is that training is essential for many jobs in Germany and without
preferences in training, achieving equal opportunity in employment is
nearly impossible. 1
70
The distinction between the use of quotas in training decisions and
their use in hiring decisions has no basis in American law. However, an
American court might accept the argument in a particular situation because
women's opportunities in employment could not be increased without a
quota for training positions. If alternatives have been exhausted without
removing inequalities, then the plan is as narrowly tailored as is possible
under the circumstances. However, absent such a showing, this training
169. Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875, 45-55.
170. PETERS, supra note 50, at 134-35. One commentator who disagrees with the
Court's judgment argues that because private training is more costly, the Court should have
expressly balanced the interests of men denied public training. Schuck, supra note 135. We
disagree. In setting out the circumstances in which positive action is permissible, the Treaty
of Amsterdam has already implicitly balanced interests in favor of aiding disadvantaged
groups. Also in distinguishing training versus employment quotas, the Court recognized the
persistent structural discrimination that women face, and will continue to face, without
greater access to training opportunities.
[Vol. 28:39
Can't We Enlarge the Blanket and the Bed?
quota would likely be declared unconstitutional by an American court,
because there is no evidence that 50% of all women are qualified for and
interested in training.
A fourth provision of the Hesse law would clearly be declared
unconstitutional by an American court. The ECJ determined that it was
consistent with EU law to guarantee that every women qualified for a
position where women were under-represented would be interviewed for
the position. 171 The position of the European Court is consistent with its
reasoning regarding training positions, namely, that the Equal Treatment
Directive should be interpreted more liberally with respect to positive
action when applied to pre-employment decisions as opposed to
employment decisions. American courts make no similar distinction under
the Equal Protection Clause that would save this law from
unconstitutionality.
Again this result of the Court is consistent with existing German
practice. Some German statutes require that where women are under-
represented, one-half of the candidates offered an interview must be
women. One state requires that all qualified women must be offered an
interview. 
72
A fifth provision of the Hesse law recommended that one-half of the
members of employee representative bodies and supervisory bodies be
women. The ECJ allowed this provision because it did not require an
inflexible quota. 173 Most German states require that half of the members of
an official organ be women.174 U.S. courts would not find the provision
unconstitutional unless a male plaintiff could prove that he was harmed by
the recommendation, which caused him not to receive the appointment for
discriminatory reasons. 175
In conclusion, in comparing positive and affirmative action, we have
noted some respects in which the ECJ is more proactive than American
courts. The European Court in Badeck permitted plans that would have
been rejected by U.S. courts. And, we have speculated about justifications
for the European position. Nevertheless, it is imperative to remember that
neither court permits much in the way of positive action. After Badeck, the
general principles of the European approach remain the same. The ECJ
171. Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875, 56-63.
172. PETERS, supra note 50, at 134-35.
173. Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875, J 64-66.
174. PETERS, supra note 50, at 136.
175. Compare Marchiorov v.Chaney, 582 P.2d 487, 492 (Wash. 1978) (upholding law
requiring state committees of major political parties to be comprised of equal numbers of
men and women because of state equal rights amendment mandating sexual equality).
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allows women to be considered for a job without stereotypes negatively
influencing the employment decision. Once a public employer has
evidence of a non-discriminatory reason favoring the male candidate, its
judgment in his favor is no longer based on stereotypes. The male
candidate may also be hired because the preference favoring the female
candidate has been rebutted. The actual situation is now worse for women.
They have been trained, interviewed, and found equally qualified, but they
still may not be hired. The next two judgments of the ECJ illustrate just
how limited the approach of the ECJ to positive action actually is.
B. Abrahamsson v. Fogelqvist
A Swedish regulation required positive action in appointments to
professional academic chairs, because extra effort was necessary to
significantly increase the number of female professors. The Swedish law
on equality, Article 16 point 2, authorized positive discriminations "where
they contribute to efforts to promote equality in the workplace."' 76 Articles
15, 15a, and 16, chapter 4 of the Swedish regulation on universities also
allowed positive discrimination but appointments had to be based on merit
and "scientific and educational abilities." 177 The specific regulation at issue
in this case was the "Swedish Regulation concerning certain professors'
and research posts created with a view to promoting equality."' 7' The
legislative history of the regulation provided that "progress towards a fairer
allocation of teaching posts as between the sexes has been particularly
slow, so that an extraordinary effort is needed to insure, in the short term, a
significant increase in the number of female professors."' 179  The 1995
Regulation replaced portions of the 1993 Regulation and required a
preference when necessary to appoint a member of the under-represented
sex, unless the appointment would breach the requirement of objectivity in
the Swedish Constitution. The Constitution, Article 9 of chapter 11,
provided that for appointment to state posts only objective criteria may be
considered, such as merit (e.g., length of service) and abilities (e.g.,
aptitudes evidenced by training and experience).180 The phrase "objective
criteria" was otherwise not defined in Swedish law. So, the Swedish Board
interpreted the phrase to mean that positive action was not to be used when
the appointment of the less-qualified candidate is likely to reduce the level
176. Abrahamsson, 2000 E. C. R.1-5539, 7.
177. Id. 8-10.
178. Id. 11.
179. Id. 13.
180. Id. 15.
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of performance in the position. 8'
The University of Gtteborg appointed a women, Ms. Fogelqvist, to a
professional academic chair. She was qualified for the position but was
judged less qualified than a male candidate, Mr. Anderson. The Rector of
the University decided that the difference in their qualifications was not so
great as to breach the objectivity requirement of the Swedish
Constitution. 1
82
Mr. Anderson and Ms. Abrahamsson, another candidate, appealed the
decision to the Universities Appeals Board. Mr. Anderson claimed that the
decision was contrary to Kalanke. Ms. Abrahamsson claimed that her
scientific output was better than that of Ms. Fogelqvist, who was appointed
to the position. The Board determined that Mr. Anderson was more
competent in the scientific area and Ms. Fogelqvist more competent in the
administrative area, though her competence was not so great as to outweigh
his scientific competence. The Board sought a preliminary ruling from the
ECJ whether the 1995 Regulation requiring positive discrimination that did
not violate the objectivity condition was consistent with Article 2(4) of the
Equal Treatment Directive.
183
The ECJ applied the principle of the Marschall decision that male
candidates must be given an individualized consideration for a position.
Arguably, the University did this under the objectivity standard set by
Swedish law. The Court, however, interpreted the Swedish law as, in
effect, creating an absolute preference for women. The Court apparently
reasoned that the Swedish standard to rebut the female preference was so
difficult to meet that there was effectively no exception to the preference.
184
The clear implication of the Court's judgment is that any standard that
permits the male candidate to rebut a preference must be no more difficult
to satisfy than the standard articulated by the Court in Marschall. 1
85
181. Id., 7-15, 25. The 1995 Regulation is referred to as the "Tham package" after a
former minister of education. At that time less than 10% of full professors were women.
"There was also a resource argument for the Tham package, namely, that a more equal
representation of women would positively affect the scope and content of research." Ann
Numhauser-Henning, Swedish Sex Equality Law before the European Court of Justice, 30
INDus.L. J. 121-22 (2001).
182. Abrahamsson, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5539, 16-20. The selection board found the
difference in scientific qualifications "considerable."
183. Id. 21-27.
184. Id. 56.
185. A remaining question not expressly answered by the Court is whether the Article
2(4) of the Directive and Article 141(4) of the Treaty of Amsterdam require that male and
female applicants be equally qualified, substantially equal or something less than that. See
Numhauser-Henning, supra note 181, at 124-26 (noting that Carl Tham has criticized the
decision for not using Article 141(4) of the Treaty to uphold the Regulation and that one
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The Court also found the Swedish selection method contrary to Article
141(4) of the Treaty. The Court simply stated that the method was
"disproportionate to the aim pursued."' 86 It is interesting to note that the
Court only referred to the second and third permitted ends of positive
action, namely, prevention of and compensation for disadvantages in
professional life. The Court did not refer to measures that make it easier
for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity. Thus, the
Court may be signaling that it intends to read the vocational/professional
distinction literally and allow greater latitude for positive action involving
vocations than for professions. The Court's flexible approach to quotas for
training slots for vocations in Badeck may be an example of the Court's use
of the vocational/professional distinction.
Marschall and Abrahamsson may be read in a way that continues the
limitation of job preferences for women, namely, that positive action may
only be used to remove explicit stereotypes in the decision-making process.
Under this reading, ECJ law requires that when individualized
consideration reveals that the male candidate is better qualified, then the
male candidate has rebutted the preference and must be hired.
87
Furthermore, a positive action plan that allows the hiring of qualified
women over better qualified men cannot promote equality of opportunity.
This type of positive action cannot be consistent with the Equal Treatment
Directive and the Treaty of Amsterdam.
88
Swedish university has abandoned its positive action plan under the permissive Regulation
of 1993 because it does not conform to the Marschall requirement of individualized
consideration).
186. Abrahamsson, 2000 E. C. R.I-5539, 55.
187. The positive action plan in Marschall required that before a female candidate may
be hired pursuant to the plan she had to be equally qualified with the male candidate in
terms of equal suitability, competence and professional performance. Marschall, 1997
E.C.R. 1-6363, 13.
188. The Court may have signaled its intent to reject positive action for less than
equally qualified candidates when it referred to its holding in Badeck allowing plans that use
positive and negative criteria to evaluate the qualifications of candidates that "in general
favor women." For example, seniority, which generally favors men, must be important for a
candidate's qualifications and part-time work and delays in training to care for dependents,
which generally favor women, must not have a negative effect on a candidate's evaluation.
Abrahamsson, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5539, % 47-48, citing Badeck, 2000 E. C. R.I-1875, 31-32.
The Court may have reasoned that these criteria are sufficient to allow women rise to a level
equal to men, thus continuing the Court's reliance on the male norm for equality. It is
important to note that the Court does not include one of the criteria allowed in Badeck,
namely, "capabilities and experience which has been acquired by carrying out family work."
This criterion was mandatory in the Badeck positive action plan. Is the Court in
Abrahamsson signaling that this criterion is too favorable to women? Abrahamsson, 2000
E.C.R. 1-5539, 48.
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Like Badeck, Abrahamsson is a case in which the Court followed
common practices. For example, in Germany. most statutory quotas
provide only for preferences that aid equally qualified candidates.
1 89
An American court would also find the Abrahamsson affirmative
action plan unacceptable. Justice Scalia dissented in Johnson, a Title VII
case in which the Court considered the validity of a gender-based
affirmative action plan. He thought that affirmative action plans are likely
to lead to the selection of under-qualified female candidates. 9 ° The
positive action plan in Abrahamsson is likely to feed these fears in judges
who fail to distinguish between less qualified and under-qualified
candidates. The Swedish law seeks to avoid hiring the under-qualified by
requiring an evaluation to determine whether an appointment under a
positive action plan is likely to reduce the level of performance in the
position.
Johnson, an American case with controversial facts regarding
candidate qualification, is interesting to compare to Abrahamsson. The
Johnson plan did not require the selection of the best-qualified candidate.
Nor did the plan require a determination that the selected candidate was as
qualified as the other remaining candidates. Rather, the plan allowed the
employer to select from the seven top candidates. The facts of
Abrahamsson did not reveal how close the qualifications of the candidates
were, though the selection board determined that the difference in scientific
credentials was considerable. By contrast, in Johnson, the qualifications of
the male candidates and the female candidate were virtually equal, though
three of the employer's supervisors had recommended the male candidate
who had scored slightly higher on an objective test. But, the director of the
agency selected the female candidate from a list of the seven top
candidates.1 91  Thus, in Johnson, the applicants were closer in their
qualifications than they might have been under Swedish law. Nevertheless,
neither plan required the selection of the best-qualified candidate or of an
equally qualified candidate.
In conclusion, the European Court used Abrahamsson to signal that it
requires at a minimum substantially equivalent qualifications in positive
action cases involving professional positions. In general, Abrahamsson
suggests a retreat from the Court's earlier positive action decisions that
189. PETERS, supra note 50, at 29.For a general discussion of sex discrimination law in
Sweden, see TAMARA HERVEY & DAVID O'KEEFFE, SEX EQUALITY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION, 338-60 (1996).
190. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657-77.
191. Petitioner's Brief at 2, 9-12, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (No.85-1129).
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were moving toward substantive equality for women. Among other things,
Sweden was not permitted to use its more demanding standard to rebut the
preference for women, even in light of the strong evidence of women's
under-representation in higher education.
1 92
C. Schnorbus v. Land Hesse
Schnorbus is not a case in which the ECJ considered the validity of a
gender-based positive action plan, but it is a case with important
implications for positive action in the EU. In Schnorbus, the ECJ upheld a
veteran's preference that adversely affected women's' training
opportunities. 
193
Ms. Schnorbus applied for practical legal training, but her application
was denied temporarily because there were already too many applications
from persons who had completed compulsory national service. She
objected on the ground that the selection procedure discriminated against
women. She argued that only men were subject to compulsory service.
Her administrative objection was dismissed because the veteran's
preference was designed to counterbalance the disadvantage suffered by
applicants who were obliged to complete military or civilian service.'
94
Upon . appeal, her request for interim relief was upheld by the
administrative court, but set aside by the higher administrative court. The
lower administrative court found discrimination against her as a woman,
given the large number of men who were able to take advantage of the
priority in comparison to the much larger number of women who applied
for training. Upon remand, the lower court sought a preliminary ruling
from the ECJ. The primary question was whether the veteran's preference
was consistent with the Equal Treatment Directive. 1
95
The ECJ concluded that the veterans' preference was not directly
discriminatory based on sex but that it was indirectly discriminatory
96
192. In a recent study in Sweden, women applying for postdoctoral fellowships had to
be 2.5 times more productive than the average male applicant to receive the same
competence score. PETERS, supra note 50, at 303 n. 122, 210 n. 525 (noting that after a
decade of positive action in some of the German states, the proportion of positions occupied
by women increased by less than 1 percent).
193. Schnorbus, 2000 E.C.R. 1-10997, 47. The Hesse statute was amended in May
1998 so that only 15% of the training slots were to be filled on the basis of hardship,
including compulsory military service. Schnorbus, 2000 E.C.R. 1-10997, 7 11 (opinion of
A.G. Jacobs).
194. Schnorbus,2000 E.C.R. 1-10997,7 14-17.
195. Id. 7 18-19.
196. Direct discrimination exists if a difference in treatment is based on a criterion
either explicitly sexual or linked to a characteristic necessarily associated with one sex.
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because women who are not required to do compulsory service cannot
benefit from the preference. However, the Court concluded that the
discrimination was within the exception of Article 2(4) because the
preference was objective and intended solely to counterbalance the delay in
training suffered by men during compulsory service. Further, women's
training was delayed no more than 12 months, a period of time equal to the
time of compulsory service.
197
Based on Marschall, the Court might have reasoned that the
preference for veterans was automatic and thus invalid, unless women were
allowed individualized consideration to rebut the preference, e.g., with
evidence of their own hardships. However, the Court arguably limited its
positive action principles to the facts of cases like Marschall, where there
was evidence that public employers were relying on gender stereotypes to
make employment decisions. In this case the Land Hesse was not relying
directly on gender stereotypes in its veteran's preference, though the policy
of excluding women from compulsory military service of women certainly
relies on gender stereotypes. Thus the principles of the Court prohibiting
gender stereotypes did not apply in Schnorbus because the gender
stereotypes were not directly applied but were one step removed.
The U.S. Supreme Court would likely hold that a veteran's preference
like the one in Schnorbus is constitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause based on Court precedent. In Personnel Administrator of Mass. v.
Feeney, 9 8 the Court upheld an absolute veterans' preference that
disproportionately advantaged men, because it was not intended to
discriminate on the basis of sex. Similarly, in Rostker v. Goldberg,' 99 the
Indirect discrimination exists when a facially neutral criterion disadvantages a substantially
higher percentage of the members of one sex. Schnorbus, 2000 E.C.R. 1-10997, 30-33
(referring to a similar definition in Article 2(2) of Council Directive 97/80 EC of 15
December 1997 on the Burden of Proof in Cases of Discrimination Based on Sex, 1998 OJ
(L14) 6). The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes a disparate impact theory as a means to prove
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Griggs v.Duke
Power Co. , 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2k (1991). The U.S. Court
distinguishes between intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) and unintentional
discrimination (disparate impact). A facially neutral practice with disparate impact does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Washington v. Davis, 428 U.S.
229, 244-45, 248 (1976). The Court reasoned that allowing disparate impact into
constitutional adjudication would produce far-reaching results, possibly invalidating a whole
range of statutes more burdensome to the average Black than to the more affluent White.
EU direct discrimination theory does not require an intent to discriminate, that is, employer
fault. Rather direct discrimination is simply discrimination based expressly on sex. See
generally, PETERS, supra note 50, at 252-54.
197. Schnorbus, 2000 E.C.R. 1-10997, 30-47.
198. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
199. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
2004]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Court held that the male-only draft is not unconstitutional sex
discrimination because only men are eligible for combat and thus the sexes
are not similarly situated. In Schlesinger v. Ballard,2 °° the Court held that a
military regulation that allowed women more time in rank before being
promoted than men did not violate equal protection. Men and women were
not similarly situated because women were not permitted to serve in
combat, which was a way to achieve promotion more quickly. These cases
reveal that both Courts will allow one discriminatory law to justify another
discriminatory law. Women are discriminated against because they are not
allowed to serve in combat. Thus, this discriminatory law results in men
and women being differently situated, and that, in turn, justifies differences
in treatment.
In conclusion, progress in Europe toward full equality as set out in the
Treaty of Amsterdam has not been smooth. And, Schnorbus represents one
of the cases in which the Court appears to balance its positive action cases
favoring women by deciding a positive action case favorable to men. We
wonder if the effect of positive action for women will continue to diminish
as Member States recognize more non-gender based preferences. And
what will be the effect on women who are told that they have been given
"preferential treatment" but still do not seem to be able to break through the
glass ceiling? Now they must compete for positive action and jobs.
D. Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw
The issue before the Court was whether the Netherlands' Ministry of
Agriculture's refusal to give Lommers access to subsidized child care,
because access was generally limited to female officials of the Ministry,
was consistent with the Equal Treatment Directive.2 °1
Article 1 a and 5 of the Law on Equal Treatment of Men and Women
provided as follows:
In the public service, the competent authority may not
make any distinction between men and women. . . as
regards working conditions (unless) the distinction
made is intended to place women in a privileged
position in order to eliminate or reduce de facto
inequalities and the distinction is reasonable in relation
200. 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
201. Lommers, 2002 E.C.R 1-2891, 1-2. The circular allowed exceptions in
emergencies as determined by the Director.
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to the aim in view.2 °2
Mr. Lommers filed a complaint with the Commission for Equal
Treatment. In response, the Ministry explained that it had decided to tackle
the under-representation of women in the Ministry, where only 2,700 of
11,200 employees were women in 1994. The Commission held that there
was no violation of Netherlands law. It found that women are less likely to
pursue a career because of child-care and that it was a reasonable
assumption that inadequate child care was likely to play a decisive role in
women's decisions in their careers. The Commission concluded that the
Ministry did what was necessary to reduce the number of female staff
members quitting their jobs. The district court endorsed the Commission's
opinion. Mr. Lommers appealed and the appeals court sought a
preliminary ruling from the ECJ.2 °3
The Court concluded that the child care scheme was discriminatory on
its face. It created a distinction in treatment based on sex because male and
female employees are comparable as regards to the possible need for
nursery facilities. However, the Court concluded that the scheme was a
permissible exception under Article 2(4). The Court compared child-care
quotas for female employees with quotas for training positions, which were
permitted in Badeck. Both quotas may be absolute, unlike quotas for
places in employment. They may be justified insofar as they are "designed
to eliminate the causes of women's reduced opportunities of access to
employment and careers and intended to improve the ability of women to
compete on the labour market and pursue a career on an equal footing with
men."
204
The Court then considered whether the measure was proportional in
relation to the goal of reducing de facto inequality. The Court noted that
nursery places were limited, that some women were on a waiting list, and
that nursery facilities were available in the private sector. Also the
Netherlands government informed the Court that male officials who raise
children by themselves have access to the government nursery.
205
The Netherlands' plan to allocate childcare to promote the substantive
equality of women in the workplace would likely run afoul of U.S. law.
Unequal terms and conditions of employment are actionable under Title
VII and the Equal Protection Clause, when intentional discrimination is
202. Id. 7-8.
203. Id 4-19.
204. Id. 24-50 (especially paragraph 33).
205. Id. 39-46.
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proven.2 °6 Employers may not defend these lawsuits by relying on
traditional job stereotypes or good-faith attempts to eradicate
207discrimination against women.
In Lommers, the child-care slots were allocated on the basis of sex.
And, there is nothing in the reported judgment from which to construct an
affirmative defense that would legally justify the employer's policy.
Without, for example, an affirmative action plan defense, the Supreme
Court would strike down the employer's child care allocation despite its
benign purpose.
In conclusion, at this time, the score in the ECJ is three decisions that
move the EC closer to full equality for women and four decisions that do
not. 208 If these cases were decided in the United States, an American court
would likely find against affirmative action in all of the cases for reasons
we have discussed previously, namely, that U.S. decisions focus too
narrowly on the intentional discriminator. U.S. courts view affirmative
action as a governmental limitation on business analogous to a criminal
statute. By contrast, the European Court, even with its limitations, does at
least consider positive action as a permissible means for a democratic
government committed to working within the market to increase the labor
participation and effectiveness of all its citizens.
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the validity of positive action plans in
cases before the European Court of Justice decided under the Equal
Treatment Directive and the Treaty of Amsterdam, and of affirmative
action plans in cases before American courts decided under Title VII and
under the American Equal Protection Clause. Our conclusion is that the
courts would reach similar results with regard to some of the positive or
affirmative action plans. A number of provisions would nevertheless be
unconstitutional under American law, although they have been upheld
under European law. This result makes it appear that the European Court is
206. LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, sec.40. 08 at 40-21-4 (2d ed.
2002).
207. See Crawford v. Scotch n' Sirloin, Inc., 47 F.E.P. 473 (N.D. N.Y. 1973)
(employer who allowed male employer with a family to work two shifts but not a female
employee with a family to support violated Title VII); Schoenfeld v. Babbit, 168 F.3d 1257
(11th Cir.1999) (violation of Title VII when employer tried to aid women by hiring an
unqualified woman).
208. Serge Briheche v. Ministare de l'intrieur, de la sdcurit9 interieur et des libertes
locales, Case C-319/03 (29 June 2004), available at <http://curia.eu.int>. The Court held
that the Equal Treatment Directive does not allow a French law that exempts widows from
the age limit for public-sector employment but excludes similarly situated widowers.
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more tolerant of positive action plans favoring women than are the U.S.
courts. And, in general we believe that this is true, though we have noted
ways in which this conclusion needs to be qualified. We believe that a
careful study of EC law offers concrete suggestions to Americans
designing affirmative action plans to achieve equality for women. ECJ
opinions and judgments also offer strategies and legal arguments that may
become more persuasive to U.S. courts. Nevertheless, we have discussed
the substantial limitations on positive action plans in the judgments of the
ECJ, and we hope that we have pointed to some interpretations of the
judgments and legislation on sex equality that will assist the EC in moving
even further toward full equality for women. *
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